Interest-Bearing Stablecoins

Interest-bearing stablecoins, either via direct issuer payments or exchange-provided rewards, would measurably erode the deposit franchise of banks in developed-market economies.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acharya
Viral Acharya
NYU Stern
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Depositors that don't require liquidity management services will seek crypto-related and higher deposit rate services of interest-bearing stablecoins. Bank franchise would get eroded by limiting the ability to diversify shocks across depositors, and by greater deposit competition
Campbell
John Campbell
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
The direction of the effect is clear, but the magnitude is not. Money market funds already compete with banks, so interest-bearing stablecoins are not the first threat to the deposit franchise.
Cochrane
John Cochrane
Hoover Institution Stanford
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
And that is the point. Interest bearing stable coins implement money market funds with payments, narrow banks, segregated accounts, all good innovations quashed by the Fed.
Diamond
Douglas Diamond
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Stablecoins are most useful for on blockchain and cross border transactions. Other than those, they are similar to existing money market funds.
Du
Wenxin Du
HBS
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Uncertain
10
Bio/Vote History
It's highly uncertain whether stablecoins will come into common use by households and businesses in developed market economies. If they do, I would agree.
Fama
Eugene Fama
Chicago Booth
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
A lot depends on how it is done.
Gabaix
Xavier Gabaix
Harvard
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Goldstein
Itay Goldstein
UPenn Wharton
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Graham
John Graham
Duke Fuqua
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Harvey
Campbell R. Harvey
Duke Fuqua
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
The average regular savings deposit rate is only 42bps. TBTF banks run at 5bps. Stablecoins offer competition with higher rates. As the SC market grows, so will the SC lending markets. Banks and private credit will have additional competition - which is good for the economy.
Hong
Harrison Hong
Columbia
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Jiang
Wei Jiang
Emory Goizueta
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Depends on whether things outside the regulatory perimeter come to dominate stable coins. You can get interest on Tether, yet USDC competes. The Genius act bans interest. So interest may move some wholesale deposits, but the impact on the deposit franchise is less obvious
Krishnamurthy
Arvind Krishnamurthy
Stanford GSB
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Alternative deposit products exist currently and yet banks retain substantial value from their deposit franchises. That indicates to me that the central friction is not limited choices. Surely there will some switching, but at the edges.
Kuhnen
Camelia Kuhnen
UNC Kenan-Flagler
Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Lowry
Michelle Lowry
Drexel LeBow
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Ludvigson
Sydney Ludvigson
NYU
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Maggiori
Matteo Maggiori
Stanford GSB
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Mester
Loretta Mester
UPenn Wharton
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Will depend on competitive response from banks.
Moskowitz
Tobias Moskowitz
Yale School of Management Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Nagel
Stefan Nagel
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Depends on at least two important unknowns: (i) How is the perception of safety of such stablecoins? This may in turn depend on the regulatory framework.(ii) How do they compare in terms of transaction convenience?
Papanikolaou
Dimitris Papanikolaou
Northwestern Kellogg
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Parker
Jonathan Parker
MIT Sloan
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Deposits are incredibly. stubbornly sticky.
Parlour
Christine Parlour
Berkeley Haas
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Philippon
Thomas Philippon
NYU Stern
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Puri
Manju Puri
Duke Fuqua
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Roberts
Michael R. Roberts
UPenn Wharton
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Sapienza
Paola Sapienza
Hoover Institution Stanford
Strongly Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Stablecoin market cap (~$170B) is a rounding error vs $17T in US deposits. Actual users are crypto-native traders and EM dollar-seekers, not retail bank depositors. Stablecoins lack payroll direct deposit, mortgage servicing, credit card linkages, and FDIC insurance.​​​​​​​​​​​​​
Seru
Amit Seru
Stanford GSB
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Deposit franchise erosion isn’t all bad if depositors were paid below-market rates:competition can be healthy. But stablecoins, especially their off-chain governance, raise real concerns. Blocking narrow banks may have backfired; innovation has returned, this time wrapped in tech
Stambaugh
Robert Stambaugh
UPenn Wharton
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Starks
Laura Starks
UT Austin McCombs
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Stein
Jeremy Stein
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Stroebel
Johannes Stroebel
NYU Stern
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Thesmar
David Thesmar
MIT Sloan
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
currently, there are a lot of firm that offer easy-to-use cash accounts that can be quickly move into and out of deposit accounts. yet, aggregate deposits remain very big and do not respond a lot to interest rates, further, it may be hard to draw many people into stablecoins.
Titman
Sheridan Titman
UT Austin McCombs
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Van Nieuwerburgh
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
Columbia Business School
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Would offer higher yields and liquidity than bank deposits and fewer regulations but don't benefit from deposit insurance. Banks may have to respond by offering higher rates, eroding franchise value.
Wallace
Nancy Wallace
Berkeley Haas
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Many unresolved problems including; uncertain regulatory classifications; uneven reserve assurance (audits); fragmentation left to markets; issuer custodian risks; asset/liquidity risk; sanctions related to violation of KYC/AML; rehypothecation risks; economic
Whited
Toni Whited
UMich Ross School
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Zhu
Haoxiang Zhu
MIT Sloan
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History