About
- C.V. Starr Professor of Economics
- Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India (2017- 2019)
- Editor, Review of Financial Studies (2025-Present)
- Resident Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2023)
Voting History
Question A:Some major private credit funds - including those offered by BlackRock, Cliffwater and Morgan Stanley - have maintained their redemption limits, not fully filling all investor requests.
The enforcement of restrictions on withdrawals from private credit funds predicts that the funds will substantially underperform indices of liquid high-yield corporate bonds over the next 18 months.
| Vote | Confidence | Median Survey Vote | Median Survey Confidence |
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Comment: Thos was a frothy asset class with all signs of underwriting standards gone awry with easy money, exacerbated by the redemption rights sold to retail investors unlike the traditional form of locked in long-term funds. Resembles bank runs or investment fund runs.
-see background information here |
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Question B: Assets in the private credit funds that are restricting withdrawals are substantially overvalued relative to their true market value.
| Vote | Confidence | Median Survey Vote | Median Survey Confidence |
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Comment: Amend and extend has taken the form now of extend and pretend, which won't work given the retail funds raised with redemption rights ... they will be forced to mark down,either by liquidating assets or raising new equity.
-see background information here |
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Interest-bearing stablecoins, either via direct issuer payments or exchange-provided rewards, would measurably erode the deposit franchise of banks in developed-market economies.
| Vote | Confidence | Median Survey Vote | Median Survey Confidence |
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Comment: Depositors that don't require liquidity management services will seek crypto-related and higher deposit rate services of interest-bearing stablecoins. Bank franchise would get eroded by limiting the ability to diversify shocks across depositors, and by greater deposit competition
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Question A: Having the government-sponsored housing agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy $200 billion in mortgage-backed securities would reduce mortgage rates by more than 25 basis points.
| Vote | Confidence | Median Survey Vote | Median Survey Confidence |
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Comment: Market failure for housing affordability is for first-time buyers not getting enough supply from potential sellers who are locked in at low mortgage rates. Better to address these two ends of the market directly. Coarse measures: GSE support, institutional restrictions won't work
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Question B: Having the government-sponsored housing agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy $200 billion in mortgage-backed securities would measurably improve the affordability of home ownership.
| Vote | Confidence | Median Survey Vote | Median Survey Confidence |
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Comment: GSE support works when it is carried out with forward guidance, not as a one off... it is too crude a measure to address the market failure due to low locked-in mortgage rates.
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Question C: Restrictions on large institutional investors buying single-family homes would measurably improve the affordability of home ownership.
| Vote | Confidence | Median Survey Vote | Median Survey Confidence |
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Comment: There is a good reason for markets to be arranged around large institutions who could serve as valuable market makers. Without evidence that this is the problem, restricting institutional ownership could impair liquidity of housing transactions, adversely affecting affordability
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