Question A:
Economic insecurity is a more important driver of the recent rise of populist movements than voters’ concerns about national culture and identity.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Populist movements that achieve electoral success lead to a substantial slowdown in economic growth.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
Some degree of potentially growth-constraining policies on trade, investment and/or migration is necessary to limit the further rise of populist movements in Europe.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are many reasons for populism and the importance of each varies by country. For many people, economic insecurity is key, while for others it is national culture/identity. I think the reluctance of centrist parties to take a long view and make hard choices is also key.
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 Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuelle Auriol |
Toulouse School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Populism is on the rise in all sorts of countries, whatever their level of development and economic success.
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 Julia Cagé |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The role of economic insecurity in the rise of populist movements has been extensively documented by Cagé & Piketty (2023, 2025) in the case of the far-right RN in France and their main conclusions – based on careful empirical and historical analysis - apply to other contexts.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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 Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Antonio Fatás |
INSEAD | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I think both factors are really important. Economic insecurity certainly also plays a major role.
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 Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I have a paper showing this band a recent boom “elements” published by CUP
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 Sergei Guriev |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Economic uncertainty is not the only and probably not the foremost reason for people being discontent. The current rise of the extremes (in Germany on both sides of the spectrum) is a sign that many people want real change rather than coalitions that got essentially stuck.
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 Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Both factors are important (i.e., have empirical support or explanatory power), but it is difficult to rank them. They can even interact.
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 Kalina Manova |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Costas Meghir |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Elias Papaioannou |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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works linking adverse economic shocks, like the European crisis (Algan et al. 2018) and secular factors, like trade globalization (Autor et al. AER, Colantone and Stanig) on populist ideology and voting. But also empirical papers pinpointing the role of cultural factors.
-see background information here -see background information here -see background information here |
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 Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Both economics and culture clearly matter; their relative importance varies across voters. For an economic model in which populism arises as a rational voter response, see my 2021 Journal of Finance article with Pietro Veronesi.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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 Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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First, the two complement each other. Second, no clear evidence in the literature of one being more important than the other.
-see background information here |
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 Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Even Scandinavia has a populist movement, even though the economic hardship and uncertainty is low compared to other countries. So economic conditions cannot be the main driver
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 Per Strömberg |
Stockholm School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Right-wing populism is overrepresented in economically inferior groups. See Dal Bo et al (REStud
-see background information here |
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 Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 John Van Reenen |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Some do and some don't. It very much depends on the country and the particular programs implemented.
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuelle Auriol |
Toulouse School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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milei as a potential exception?
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Julia Cagé |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Antonio Fatás |
INSEAD | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sergei Guriev |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But there is an element of tautology inasmuch as policies tend to be categorised as populist when they are ineffective or counterproductive albeit plausible.
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The statement is too bold/too easy to be true for all types of extremist populism. To some extent, populist movements have not much to do with the economy, and leave it more or less "free hand".
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I definitely see conceptual arguments or reasons. There is some evidence but not yet strong empirical support.
-see background information here |
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Kalina Manova |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elias Papaioannou |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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clear-cut empirical evidence of the costs of populism: lower output growth, slight increase (or no movement at best) of inequality, plus significant adverse effects on institutions, which in turn affect long-run growth
-see background information here |
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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See Guriev and Papaioannou
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It is very hard to establish causality, but the best that the literature has been able to do supports the statement.
-see background information here |
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Per Strömberg |
Stockholm School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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While one can find arguments to support this (political instability, cronyism, loss of trade, loss of workforce due to lower immigration, demographic pension deficits, etc) I am not aware of any empirical evidence.
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I have seemed limited evidence on negative long run effects. Short run can go the other way round.
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Question C Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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My view on this is similar to my first reply. In Europe the problem is that many governments seem unwilling to take a long view and go for easy short term measures. The reluctance by many governments to spend what is needed on defence is a good example.
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuelle Auriol |
Toulouse School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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even if positive in the aggregate, some lose, who cannot be easily compensated, and we have to pay more attention to them, both on human and political grounds.
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Julia Cagé |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Yes, but we can't lump everything together! In particular, introducing fiscal, social, and environmental protectionism seems to be the most urgent task today (migration policy is a different matter). Moreover, such policies might not constrain growth.
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Antonio Fatás |
INSEAD | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I still think that smart policies are possible. Also, policies should be better explained.
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sergei Guriev |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I disagree because I think what a successful anti-populist movement needs is a bold plan or idea that stimulates plans and visions for a better future. My preferred such vision is a democratically legitimized push for a stronger Europe - in defense, economics, financial markets
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I see populist movements as considerable threat to democracy and so sacrificing some growth or accepting some economic loss to quell these movements makes sense. But we don't know which policies reliably work in limiting populism, or if suggested restrictions work, so uncertain.
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Kalina Manova |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elias Papaioannou |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are other, growth-promoting policies that could do the job. See the Draghi or Letta reports.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It may be part of a the optimal bundle of policies, but it is not necessarily so. Also, following the first question, raising economic growth would reduce the populist appeal, so constraining growth goes in the wrong direction.
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Europe needs policies to increase growth and investments and reduce red tape and bureaucracy to combat populism. In addition the immigration policies that have been put in place lead to adverse selection and poor assimilation.
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Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Per Strömberg |
Stockholm School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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EU have already implemented such policies. Should do less rather than more at this point.
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Dealing with current issues with standard policies can do, if and when undertaken forcefully.
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