Question A:
A substantial loss of Federal Reserve independence would substantially increase the overall nominal cost of U.S. government borrowing.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
A substantial loss of Federal Reserve independence would substantially raise risk premia on long-term U.S. government debt.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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![]() John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Who cares about the nominal, not real cost of borrowing? If you mean inflation, it is not clear that the Fed always wants less inflation than congress or president. If you mean real costs, the Fed must have limited power to lower real rates for very long without repression
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![]() Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Governments without independent central banks and with large nominal debts have taken monetary policies that increase inflation. The market will anticipate this and price in more inflation.
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![]() Wenxin Du |
HBS | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Eugene Fama |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I agree it would increase the cost of borrowing but it is not obvious it would "substantially" increase the cost of borrowing. Currently, there is no credible competitor to the dollar as reserve currency - even with a less independent central bank.
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![]() Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The timing of when it happens will be hard to tell, but the list of countries where this is happened shows that the direction of travel is certain.
-see background information here |
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![]() Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Fed independence is key to controlling inflation, and without that important factor, investors---particularly foreign investors---will place less faith in U.S. debt maintaining its value, and will therefore charge higher yields.
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![]() Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Evidence suggests that greater central bank independence lowers interest rates on sovereign debt. The balance of democratic accountability and independence, struck by the structure of the Fed has lead to low and anchored inflation expectations and low US interest rates.
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![]() Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Paola Sapienza |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Uncertain because if the President succeeds in inducing the Fed to lower interest rates (as Nixon with Arthur Burns in the 1970s), nominal borrowing costs go down in the ST but as inflation expectations increase in the LT, the government faces higher overall LT borrowing cost.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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![]() Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Given the dire fiscal situation of the U.S., loss of independence would lead to financial repression with monetary policy put in service of the fiscal situation.
-see background information here |
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![]() Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In a regime of fiscal dominance, inflation expectations will rise when the government's fiscal position deteriorates, driving bond returns down in bad times and therefore raising the risk premium demanded by investors.
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![]() John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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By "risk premia" do you mean inflation premiums or default premiums? Both might rise. Don't rule out bondholder haircuts in a crisis.
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![]() Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Uncertainty about how much inflation will be caused by future governments will choose in bad versus good times could increase their real interest rates. Government bonds in the past have offered low returns to investors because they are very safe. This may disappear.
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![]() Wenxin Du |
HBS | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Eugene Fama |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I agree the risk premium will increase. It is not obvious it would "substantially" increase. A less independent central bank will cause some to diversify their U.S. holdings. De-dollarization is impt. China has established 31 bilateral swap lines consistent with de-dollarization.
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![]() Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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See above, same argument and evidence
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![]() Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Same reason as above.
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![]() Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The dominating effect probably would be a rise in inflation risk premia.
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![]() Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Evidence suggests that greater central bank independence lowers interest rates on sovereign debt. Less independent central banks are more inclined to inflate away fiscal problems and so raise inflation risk premia.
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![]() Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Paola Sapienza |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Investors would demand higher compensation for the increased risks they perceive from reduced Fed independence, such as greater inflation risk or concerns about monetary policy being influenced by political rather than economic considerations. Probably they are already doing that
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![]() Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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there would be substantial policy uncertainty that would raise the risk premium on long-term debt.
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![]() Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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