Inflation and Central Bank Independence

Question A:

If the European Central Bank changed its inflation target from 2% to 3%, the long-run costs of inflation for households would be essentially unchanged.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

There is a substantial benefit to having higher average inflation and by implication a higher nominal interest rate so as to avoid hitting the zero lower bound.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question C:

The fact that the Eurozone encompasses 20 countries – and thus the European Central Bank has 20 masters rather than one like the US Federal Reserve – eliminates the risk of fiscal dominance.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
It's an interesting question. I'm not sure there is much empirical evidence concerning this. If the target was 4%, would the same argument hold? There may be an optimal target and it may well be 2% since that is what so many central banks focus on.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
I have been arguing for it for some time. I initially argued for 4%, but concluded from the salience evidence that 3% was more prudent.
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Botticini
Maristella Botticini
Bocconi
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Heterogeneity in the effects of inflation (on households of different income levels, regional heterogeneity, etc.) plays a role and becomes more substantial with higher inflation rates.
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Gorodnichenko
Yuriy Gorodnichenko
Berkeley
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Guriev
Sergei Guriev
London Business School
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
But moving to a new target without destabilising expectations for the short run would be tricky. Best if other leading central banks were also converging on 3%.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Costs of inflation will likely change because people will have learned that inflation targets are a matter of discretion, and can no longer be taken for granted. Thus, long term expectations will reflect an additional (moral) risk of inflation target change.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
3% is quite a bit more noticeable than 2%.
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Propper
Carol Propper
Imperial College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Rasul
Imran Rasul
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Reis
Ricardo Reis
London School of Economics
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Workers must engage in costly search and bargaining to have their wages keep up, and the increase in the inflation risk premium on the large stock of government bonds would ultimately fall on the taxpayer.
-see background information here
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Storesletten
Kjetil Storesletten
University of Minnesota
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
For (expected) inflation close to zero, the costs are small. The difference between 2% and 3% is negligible
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
While a move from 2% to 3% is neutral in theory, I worry that the public perception of a 3% traget could be quite different from a 2% target.
Tenreyro
Silvana Tenreyro
LSE
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
The cost from moving to 3% is not negligible. It is easy for people to ignore 2% inflation; but as the target moves to 3% or above, it is harder to ignore. A move from 2 to 3 could be more acceptable if all central banks were to move in tandem.
Van der Ploeg
Rick Van der Ploeg
Oxford
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Inflation is likely to be more stable at 2%, and inflation expectations better anchored.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
This is not clear to me. With a 3% target there may be more volatility in inflation rates and as a result the zero lower bound could conceivably be hit more often.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
I still believe that there is a decent probability that we reach the zlb again. 1% more than the current target would give more room.
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Botticini
Maristella Botticini
Bocconi
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
This is exactly what we found in our paper with Andrade, Le Bihan and Matheron using a DSGE model estimated for the euro area:
-see background information here
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Gorodnichenko
Yuriy Gorodnichenko
Berkeley
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Guriev
Sergei Guriev
London Business School
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Even though r-star may tend to creep up in the years ahead.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
The zero lower bound is an illusion, no? People can learn dealing with rates in negative territory - thereby invalidating the argument pro higher inflation target. Because higher inflation target means higher social costs of price level changes.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Propper
Carol Propper
Imperial College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Rasul
Imran Rasul
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Reis
Ricardo Reis
London School of Economics
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Yes, but conditional on (i) the value of r* affecting the chance of hitting the ZLB and (ii) the large costs on the other side form the previous question
-see background information here
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Storesletten
Kjetil Storesletten
University of Minnesota
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Two benefits of a slightly larger inflation target: (1) slightly lower probability of hitting the zero lower bound; (2) downward nominal wage rigidity would be a slightly smaller problem because inflation would lower the real wage for firms that cannot lower nominal wages
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Tenreyro
Silvana Tenreyro
LSE
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
As economies become more digitalised, the effective lower bound falls, creating more monetary policy space for central banks, and reducing the benefits of a higher inflation target.
Van der Ploeg
Rick Van der Ploeg
Oxford
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
That benefit could be outweighed by costs, including for inflation expectations.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History

Question C Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
I wouldn't say the multitude of countries eliminates fiscal dominance but it may make it less likely. It presumably depends on the debt structure and how much of EU debt is a joint liability, among other things.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Botticini
Maristella Botticini
Bocconi
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
I would have agreed had you written that the risk of fiscal dominance is reduced, rather than eliminated
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
It might slighlty weaken that risk, but certainly doesn't eliminate it.
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
I'd say the number of fiscal masters is not as important as the independence of the Governing Council members
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Gorodnichenko
Yuriy Gorodnichenko
Berkeley
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Guriev
Sergei Guriev
London Business School
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Multi-country setup helps but does not wholly eliminate the danger.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Strongly Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
In fact, the opposite claim is more likely to be true: Fiscal dominance may be the outcome of free-riding on monetary stability by independent fiscal authorities in the European Union , e.g., by issuing government debt at the national level without observing appropriate limits.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Eliminates is probably too strong, hence uncertain. It definitely mitigates.
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Given the substantial fiscal needs of the 20 countries in the coming years, and the lack of fiscal coordination among them, the threat of fiscal dominance seems quite significant.
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Propper
Carol Propper
Imperial College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Rasul
Imran Rasul
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Reis
Ricardo Reis
London School of Economics
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Eliminates is much too strong, yes if the question said attenuates. Also the weight/dominance of each country is not 1/20.
-see background information here
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Storesletten
Kjetil Storesletten
University of Minnesota
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
The ECB seemed beholden to political influence during the Greek debt crisis. This suggests that fiscal dominance might be bigger problem in EU
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Tenreyro
Silvana Tenreyro
LSE
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Van der Ploeg
Rick Van der Ploeg
Oxford
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
It certainly reduces the risk but does not eliminate it
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History