Question A:
US export controls on advanced semiconductor technology and equipment will contribute substantially to maintaining US technological dominance in the industry over the next ten years.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
US export controls on advanced semiconductor technology and equipment will substantially raise China's presence in the industry over the next ten years.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
In ten years, historians will judge that the US’s current use of sanctions, export restrictions and tariffs in critical sectors substantially improved the median American citizen’s welfare.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The key restriction is not the sale of chips per se but on EDA (Electronic Design Automation) software and the photolithography equipment manufactured by ASML.
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It needs to be done cleverly and the relationship is likely to be U-shaped.
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Export controls increase the cost to China of technological development and innovation, but they also increase the benefit of developing restricted technologies. Net effects are unclear. Consider that cheap chinese exports decimated American certain American industries.
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I used to be skeptical, but my own work on semiconductors has convinced me that past US export controls and restrictions on Chinese investments have been successful in slowing down China.
-see background information here |
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Well-targeted controls may succeed but I doubt that the controls enacted will be based on what is good for the country.
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Technology wants to be free. Did not work for theUK in the 18th and 19th centuries.
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Substantial is a high bar, especially since the policies seem so erratic.
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Peterson Institute for International Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Parag Pathak |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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These are tough. Lots of uncertainty. Export restrictions seem to be mildly effective at present, but there is a lot of time and scope for substitution and change.
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ivan Werning |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In the short term, probably yes. Over 10 years having substantial impact is much less certain, especially due to the response and investment by China.
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This has already begun and there's no turning back. China's new restrictions on Nvidia chips demonstrate that China has firmly decided to break free of U.S. technology dependency. China will pay a steep cost in the short run, harvest a huge strategic asset in the longer run.
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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China's incentive to develop and produce is increased by US export controls.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Its a plausible theory, but effects are unknown.
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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See previous question. China may end up dominating the industry, but this will be DESPITE the export controls, not because of them.
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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US controls will create opportunities for all potential competitors, not just China.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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China will invest one way or another. Not clear what the additional effect is here.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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My forecast is that China is going to raise its presence anyway. So drawing a causal link to this US policy is hard
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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On both these questions, it is uncertain because of the extent of leakage of the technology. Hard to see that US can prevent leakage over more than a few years, if that.
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Peterson Institute for International Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Parag Pathak |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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China has shown an eagerness to fill other voids left by the US, and is likely to exploit this opportunity as well.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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So much is going to depend on the specifics of the restrictions, how they are enforced, and on the responses of other countries.
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Ivan Werning |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The incentives are now there and the response by China has been in that direction. So this seems to me quite likely.
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Question C Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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How could anyone ever be certain of such a thing, even ex post? The counterfactual will be unknowable.
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Counterfactual scenario will be very difficult to evaluate.
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Seems challenging for other effects to overwhelm price effects for the median person.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The impact on welfare via US prosperity is probably negative and the impact on welfare via national security is presumably positive.. I'm uncertain of the net welfare effect.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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We will never know the counterfactual and whether today's policies increase or decrease welfare, but I doubt American prosperity will look rosier in 10 years than today and prompt people to laud today's policies.
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Slowing down China or maintaining US dominance in semiconductors has little to do with the welfare of the median citizen.
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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higher prices will harm consumers. whether they have beneficial effects for the "median American citizen's welfare" in other ways (e.g., higher wages) is very uncertain
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It seems at least as likely that the disengagement and fracturing of trading relations makes us worse off.
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Same answer as before.
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Peterson Institute for International Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Parag Pathak |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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These policies are likely to inhibit the innovation and dynamism of the US economy, adversely affecting most citizens.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ivan Werning |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Putting aside the mistaken broader protectionist trade policy, one can make a geopolitical case for some narrow trade and industrial policies in critical sectors. Those decisions are inherently uncertain and difficult to judge at this point.
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