Question A:

Having companies run to maximize shareholder value creates significant negative externalities for workers and communities.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

Appropriately managed corporations could create significantly greater value than they currently do for a range of stakeholders – including workers, suppliers, customers and community members – with small impacts on shareholder value.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question C:

Effective mechanisms for boards of directors to ensure that CEOs act in ways that balance the interests of all stakeholders would be straightforward to introduce.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
I think the issue of stakeholder governance is a very important and much understudied subject. It has been difficult to publish papers.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Uncertain
10
Bio/Vote History
Not necessarily. Depends on distortions in the market and in the economy as a whole.
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Depends on the horizon of the shareholders and on the regulation.
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
2 caveats: 1 if there are inefficiencies at firm level (market power in output or input); 2 channel may be indirect via equil wages
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Strongly Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Pollution the most obvious, but also other social costs.
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Sometimes does, sometimes not. When it does, law and regulation can/should be used to counteract.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
There is a route to maximizing shareholder value while simultaneously upholding stakeholder utility: That is German Ordnungspolitik.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Co should max sh welfare not value. Even Milton F recognized these externalities, need laws & ethics as constraints & perhaps stronger ones.
-see background information here
-see background information here
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
I agree with this statement, though maximizing shareholder value also encourages efficient profit-making which has social value
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
True but it creates not only negative but also positive externalities. The net effect varies across firms.
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
For example carbon is not properly priced.
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Uncertain because much depends on surrounding public policies towards such externalities.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
This could be the case (e.g. if profit maximizing involved polluting the environment) but these cases are best dealt with via regulation.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Again very understudied.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Uncertain
9
Bio/Vote History
there are probably such cases. In general, it is primarily the job of the government to put in place the right regulations.
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Probably not at short horizon. More uncertain at longer horizons.
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Provided a long run perspective is adopted
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Short-termism and weak ethical principles likely limit the social contribution of many corporations, especially in complex market segments.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
In its generality, the statement is hard to disagree with...
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Unlikely as implies corp leave lots money on table or managers extract huge rents; yet maximizing stakeh. welfare could address externalit.
-see background information here
-see background information here
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Modern corporations should be regulated, including anti-trust, regulation to ensure compliance with environmental and labor standards, etc.
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Possible for some firms, but unlikely for most.
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Some cost cutting decisions are often very short term and destroy value in the long run. Example: fraud (diesel emissions scandal)
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
I'm not sure there is sufficient empirical evidence to back up this statement.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History

Question C Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
I think it will be very difficult to do in practice. The German system of codetermination may be better.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
I believe in more representation of workers on the board, primarily for information and trust reasons.
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Introducing such mechanisms would not be straightforward, but something can be done
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Regulation and legal mechanisms must be complemented by changes in investors’ convictions!
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Not even sure current systems guarantee maximum shareholder value
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Long term profitability will not be maximized when other stakeholders' interests are manifestly violated.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
It would clearly be difficult but this does not imply that one should not try. There are many difficult governance problems.
-see background information here
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Regulation is a multi-faceted goal; legistating on the composion of boards of directors may not be a good instrument to achieve it
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Strongly Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Needs a lot of information and to design proper incentive mechanisms
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Strongly Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Why would this be easy? It's a really complex issue.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History