Question A:
Concerns about the environmental impact of companies are substantially better resolved by shareholder activism towards management than by regulations or government intervention.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Concerns about diversity, equality and inclusion within companies are substantially better resolved by shareholder activism towards management than by regulations or government intervention.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
In my view shareholder activism is less effective than regulation or taxation in mitigating environmental harms, but may be helpful if government action is prevented or enfeebled by political opposition.
-see background information here |
||||
 John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
In a completely free market maybe, but activists are protected by extensive regulation of public companies. They also typically represent narrow political groups. Old school regulation -- under legislation, administrative procedures act, etc -- can work better.
|
||||
 Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Activists tend to focus on one issue and also had mixed success: their strategy pays off only if the market agrees and there is substantial disagreement on what the optimal strategy is
|
||||
 Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
If there are large externalities, shareholder activism is ineffective. Regulation of firm activity would be more effective. If a carbon tax was the answer, but not feasible, regulation could be the next best intervention.
|
||||
 Wenxin Du |
HBS | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Environmental damage is the sort of externality that is better addressed by regulation. Shareholders have a conflict of interest.
|
||||
 Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
In principal, spillovers and other public goods are best addressed with public sector tools applied consistently. Though companies still market their brands and their reputation to customers and the public, inviting scrutiny of the consistency between behavior and branding.
|
||||
 Eugene Fama |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
A level playing field requires that all firms are subject to the same rules.
|
||||
 Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
The environment is an externality, so purely private moves won't be enough. On the other hand, before full regulations arrive, it's desirable to experiment in a decentralized manner
|
||||
 Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
For most issues, I believe that shareholders can resolve. However, the question seems to imply 100% shareholder activism and 0% regulation. I believe there is a role for some limited regulation to mitigate the public goods problem.
|
||||
 Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Governmental policies / regulations address all companies, and they are better positioned to address negative environmental externalities.
|
||||
 Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
shareholder maximization and social welfare maximization are not synonymous
|
||||
 Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
There are environmental externalities that private agents do not internalize, either shareholder or managers. Government intervention is necessary
|
||||
 Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Governments make the laws and in a much better place to correct system-wide externalities. Corporate governance is structured well to maximize social welfare given good regulation, and poorly for replacing regulation.
|
||||
 Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Externalities are social problems.
|
||||
 Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Paola Sapienza |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
According to M Friedman shareholders would want to “make as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of the society.” Rule of society could include rules over reducing pollution as long as the political branch is able to legislate citizens’ consensus.
|
||||
 Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Governments are generally best place to respond to externalities such as carbon emissions!
|
||||
 Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Many environmental issues arise from negative external ivies which shareholders have no incentive to internalize.
|
||||
 Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
My response is the same as to the environmental question. Shareholder activism is a second-best response that may be helpful when government action is not forthcoming.
|
||||
|
John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
It is unclear if DEI is in need of government intervention. It has many aspects and it is clear that discrimination is illegal. Law enforcement is required and regulations coming from laws may be an enforcement mechanism.
|
||||
|
Wenxin Du |
HBS | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Eugene Fama |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
but regulation and government intervention may not work well in practice either
|
||||
|
Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Again, it depends whether the concerns are about externalities.
|
||||
|
Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
When there is a natural benefit for companies from policies that maximize their employee's talents and talent pool, this should not require shareholder activism, just smart managers. The government should address social goals like societal injustices or redressing past wrongs.
|
||||
|
Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Paola Sapienza |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
As long as the regulation is the result of a Democratic process. Not sure shareholders should be involved.
|
||||
|
Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Corporate stakeholders should decide how to best achieve their DEI goals. some reporting requirements may be useful.
|
||||
|
Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
