Philippe Aghion |
Harvard |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
4 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
3 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
4 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
1 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
5 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
3 |
|
8 |
The causes of the financial crisis are numerous. Much more work needs to be done to understand the relative importance of each.
Bio/Vote History |
Pol Antras |
Harvard |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
4 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
No Opinion |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
4 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
2 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
3 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
3 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
7 |
Bio/Vote History |
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
4 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
No Opinion |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
2 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
4 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
3 |
|
7 |
Bio/Vote History |
Timothy J. Besley |
LSE |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
3 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
3 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
1 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
3 |
|
9 |
The list is a good one. Nearly all the factors combined to shape the crisis.
Bio/Vote History |
Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
1 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
1 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
3 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
0 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
1 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
0 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
0 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
0 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
0 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
0 |
|
7 |
This list seems rather unbalanced towards the banking sector and away from the real side of the economy. House prices went too high, and then collapsed and the economy followed. I think amplifying this I would also add uncertainty – my pet peeve.
Bio/Vote History |
Richard William Blundell |
University College London |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Elena Carletti |
Bocconi |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
4 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
4 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
3 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
3 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
5 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
4 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
5 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
5 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
3 |
|
10 |
Difficult to rate these items, in particular in isolation. Many are interrelated in that they are relevant in conjunction with others.
Bio/Vote History |
Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
2 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
4 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
5 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
2 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
8 |
Bio/Vote History |
Paul De Grauwe |
LSE |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
5 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
3 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
3 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
4 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
4 |
|
5 |
Bio/Vote History |
Jan Eeckhout |
University College London |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
4 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
3 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
3 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
3 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
2 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
1 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
5 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
1 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
2 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
6 |
Bio/Vote History |
Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
1 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
No Opinion |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
2 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
2 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
2 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
No Opinion |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
7 |
TBTF is tricky. Banks had far too little equity for –‘ve shocks, prob b/c they underestimated shock risks. TBTF beliefs could have driven this. But top mgrs likely to lose jobs if rescued, so hard to believe they gambled BECAUSE they expected rescue.
Bio/Vote History |
Xavier Freixas |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
3 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
3 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
4 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
4 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
1 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
3 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
5 |
Bio/Vote History |
Jordi Galí |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
4 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
3 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
3 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
2 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
7 |
Bio/Vote History |
Luis Garicano |
LSE |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
5 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
3 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
2 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
2 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
2 |
|
6 |
The interplay between ever rising house prices (with extrapolative expectations on future increases), a broken Financial Engineering technology leading to excessive credit access and ridiculously lax capital requirements for banks led to build up and bust.
Bio/Vote History |
Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
4 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
3 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
3 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
No Opinion |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
1 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
No Opinion |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
4 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
No Opinion |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
No Opinion |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
1 |
Bio/Vote History |
Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
3 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
2 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
1 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
2 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
5 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
0 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
9 |
Bio/Vote History |
Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
2 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
4 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
2 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
1 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
2 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
1 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
4 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
4 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
4 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
7 |
Bio/Vote History |
Martin Hellwig |
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
5 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
2 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
4 |
|
9 |
This was tremendous market failure, facilitated by bad regulation and weak supervision. TBTF was less important because they never thought of failing. Global interconnectedness, direct or through market prices, should als be high on the list. -see background information here and here.
Bio/Vote History |
Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
4 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
3 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
2 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
1 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
2 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
2 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
0 |
|
8 |
Reckless risk taking by bankers reflected hubris, distorted incentives, over-confidence in risk management techniques and disaster myopia. Regulators were complacent, Easy money and savings glut were merely the macro background context.
Bio/Vote History |
Botond K?szegi |
Central European University |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
No Opinion |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
No Opinion |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
3 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
No Opinion |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
No Opinion |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
3 |
Bio/Vote History |
Henrik Kleven |
Princeton |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
2 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
1 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
|
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
5 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
0 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
9 |
Ultimately, the 2008 GFC was about systemic risk, which forced governments to intervene and to reject bank resolution.
Bio/Vote History |
Per Krusell |
Stockholm University |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
1 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
4 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
3 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
1 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
2 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
3 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
2 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
1 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
7 |
Regulating financial markets is in principle important but very difficult. One, it is hard to figure out what “frictions” to focus on (some of which are government-induced). Two, financial institutions will adapt to avoid any restrictions…
Bio/Vote History |
Eliana La Ferrara |
Bocconi |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
2 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
3 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
2 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
2 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
3 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
1 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
5 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
1 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
2 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
0 |
|
7 |
Contains causes & amplifiers. Gave lower scores to boosters. H’hold debt&bank leverage are endogenous. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) were key mechanism not cause. Flawed incentives, weak supervision & unsophisticated players fueled bubble & weakened mkt’s corrective forces. -see background information here
Bio/Vote History |
Costas Meghir |
Yale |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Peter Neary |
Oxford |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
4 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
3 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
No Opinion |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
3 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
3 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
No Opinion |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
4 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
3 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
5 |
Sophisticated financial instruments can improve the efficiency of financial markets and need not be destabilizing. But regulators should ensure that their ultimate asset base is transparent and that holders have adequate margins.
Bio/Vote History |
Kevin O’Rourke |
Oxford |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
3 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
5 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
4 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
1 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
5 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
0 |
|
4 |
Several of the above items are different facets of the same phenomenon, rather than alternative factors. E.g. bad incentives in mortgage issuance and Financial Engineering & failures by Rating Agency Failures; or TBTF & flawed Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision.
Bio/Vote History |
Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
4 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
4 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
3 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
2 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
4 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
3 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
8 |
Bio/Vote History |
Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Christopher Pissarides |
LSE |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |
Richard Portes |
London Business School |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
4 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
4 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
1 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
2 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
0 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
0 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
5 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
0 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
3 |
|
9 |
Add: excessive leverage throughout system (not just households); withholding LOLR support from Lehman. Both get 4.
Bio/Vote History |
Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
No Opinion |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
No Opinion |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
No Opinion |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
No Opinion |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
3 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
1 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
No Opinion |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
No Opinion |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
No Opinion |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
No Opinion |
|
3 |
Bio/Vote History |
Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
1 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
5 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
5 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
0 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
3 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
0 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
8 |
Bio/Vote History |
Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
3 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
1 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
3 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
1 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
2 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
4 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
8 |
Bio/Vote History |
Hélène Rey |
London Business School |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
4 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
2 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
5 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
5 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
3 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
1 |
|
8 |
Many factors contributed to the 2008 global financial crisis. But at the heart of the mechanism was a dysfunctional financial sector with misallocation of capital, bad incentives, insufficient supervision and some fraudulent behaviour.
Bio/Vote History |
Antoinette Schoar |
MIT |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
3 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
2 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
2 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
3 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
5 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
3 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
3 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
2 |
|
7 |
Bio/Vote History |
John Van Reenen |
MIT |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
4 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
4 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
0 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
3 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
1 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
3 |
|
7 |
Financial regulation was the major problem . Reforms have helped stabilize & it’s important that US does not roll them back (see Yellen’s 2017 speech in Jackson Hole) -see background information here
Bio/Vote History |
John Vickers |
Oxford |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
4 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
3 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
3 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
2 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
2 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
2 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
0 |
|
8 |
Leverage was grossly excessive, making the system too fragile to withstand the shock of the subprime crisis and its effects on property prices and associated derivatives.
Bio/Vote History |
Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
5 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
5 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
5 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
4 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
3 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
3 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
2 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
4 |
|
7 |
Bio/Vote History |
Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
Gutenberg University Mainz and INSEAD |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
4 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
3 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
4 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
2 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
3 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
1 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
3 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
4 |
|
9 |
Bio/Vote History |
Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
2 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
2 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
2 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
3 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
2 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
2 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
2 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
2 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
2 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
|
|
7 |
Ultimately, the global financial crisis reflected poor regulation and supervision of the banking sector. The other items listed are just factors that regulators should have been taking into account or paying better attention to.
Bio/Vote History |
Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva |
A. |
Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision |
5 |
B. |
Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) |
3 |
C. |
Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives |
3 |
D. |
Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) |
5 |
E. |
Rating Agency Failures |
4 |
F. |
Housing-Price Beliefs |
2 |
G. |
Household Debt Levels |
3 |
H. |
Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs |
4 |
I. |
Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning |
1 |
J. |
Savings and Investment Imbalances |
0 |
K. |
Loose Monetary Policy |
0 |
L. |
Fair-Value Accounting |
0 |
|
7 |
Proper regulation and supervision would have prevented the crisis.
Bio/Vote History |
Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Universität Zurich |
|
|
Bio/Vote History |