Question A:
The current antitrust laws and regulations in the United States are inadequate for preventing digital platform firms from engaging in acquisitions and exclusionary conduct that harm competition.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Background on the Digital Markets Act: https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index_en
Digital markets would work better if, in a manner broadly similar to the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, criteria were established to designate some large firms as 'gatekeepers' and a regulatory body was established to govern the business practices of those gatekeepers.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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They are completely inadequate for the tech age, and they are not being enforced.
-see background information here |
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 Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There is a caveat that monopolization enforcement can be slow and costly. But that concern is not specific to this particular set of firms.
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Problems are not unique to digital firms. The law has become too defendant friendly.
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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They may get the right result eventually but they operate very slowly
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I wonder if current interpretations and applications of antitrust law is adequate to prevent actions that hurt competition.
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Peterson Institute for International Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Parag Pathak |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Current antitrust law and practice, more than a century old, are not equipped to deal with digital markets.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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While there are large digital platform firms, this reflects the value of size in the industry due to network effects and learning-from-big-data. Even so, entry remains a potent threat, with TikTok, Zoom, Shopify as recent examples.
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 Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hard to dissent the regulations from the regulators.
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Ivan Werning |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The laws may not be as explicit but still leave room for the right implementation and enforcement.
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are real drawbacks to adopting a rule-based system particular to particular designated firms in technologically evolving markets.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It depends entirely upon how responsibly the regulator would behave. Too much government power can create its own problems.
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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A regulatory body can make mistakes but it deals with problems more expeditiously. On balance I think the benefits exceed the costs..
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Effective bureaucratic processes will slow down progress. There will be substantial costs even if firms can work around the regulations.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Peterson Institute for International Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Parag Pathak |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Regulation is needed; it is less clear that the Digital Markets Act of the best model.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Everything would depend on the "regulatory body," which, like all regulators would be imperfect.
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Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Regulating the firms that have collectively been the greatest creators of consumer surplus and wealth in the world in recent decades will not improve the performance of these markets.
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Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Ivan Werning |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pervasive aspects of tech markets such as network externalities, the need for interoperability, etc, create a case for market rules that help solve these particular issues. Challenging but needed. (Whether European DMA in particular accomplishes this efficiently is debatable.)
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