Keyword: European Central Bank

This European survey examines (a) Europe’s economic growth performance over the last 25 years has been measurably better than it would have been in the absence of the single currency; (b) With euro area member states having given up their ability to carry out independent monetary policy, it is substantially more difficult for them to respond effectively to country-specific macroeconomic disturbances

This week's European Economic Experts Panel statements: A) The ECB should aim to achieve an inflation rate that averages 2% over time. B) The ECB should take account of the environmental implications of its policy decisions. C) The objectives set for the ECB by Treaty should make maximum sustainable employment of equal importance as price stability.

This week’s IGM European Economic Experts Panel statements: A) Severe lockdowns – including closing non-essential businesses and strict limitations on people’s movement – are likely to be better for the economy in the medium term than less aggressive measures. B) While national governments have responded to the crisis with substantial economic policy measures, a joint euro area fiscal response is still highly desirable. C) Given the willingness of the European Central Bank to buy sovereign bonds, including Italian bonds, without limits, there is no need for ‘coronabonds’.

With the Eurozone economy weakening, many commentators are calling on the European Central Bank (ECB) to provide fresh stimulus. But what if the diverse monetary policy tools used by the ECB since the financial crisis have reached the limits of their effectiveness in promoting recovery? Could European governments contribute to stimulating the economy by increasing public spending or reducing taxes? And should fiscal policy now be focused more on raising demand by ‘loosening the public purse strings’ than on reducing public debt?

Christine Lagarde, currently head of the International Monetary Fund, has been nominated to succeed Mario Draghi as president of the European Central Bank (ECB). The announcement came as part of a package of appointments to other key roles in European institutions: the president of the European Commission; the president of the European Council; and the European Union’s high representative for foreign and security policy.

This week’s IGM European Economic Experts Panel statements: A) Breaking the “doom loop” — a negative spiral that can result when banks hold sovereign bonds and governments bail out banks — would increase the stability of European economies in the event of another financial crisis. B) Regulators should try to break the doom loop by assigning positive risk weights — in calculating banks’ capital requirements — to banks’ holdings of domestic and other Eurozone sovereign bonds. C) Breaking the doom loop would impose substantial costs on powerful political constituencies.

This week’s European Economic Experts Panel statements: A) The ECB's asset purchases over the past two years have reduced the threat of deflation in the euro area as a whole. B) If the economic outlook in the euro area becomes less favorable, then increasing the ECB's asset purchase program (in size or duration) would substantially increase the euro area's economic growth over the following five years.

This week’s IGM Economic Experts Panel statements: A) Assuming that Germany eventually agrees to backstop the debt of southern European countries, the eurozone as a whole will be better off if that bailout is unconditional, rather than accompanied by the labor market reforms and future budget controls that Germany is demanding of countries in return. B) If Germany fails to bail out the southern tier of Europe, its own economy will be hurt more — because of output and asset losses — than it would be by an unconditional bailout. C) The main reason other eurozone countries need to worry about Greek banks losing access to ECB support is because the ensuing chaos in Greece could trigger bank runs in peripheral countries.

This week’s IGM Economic Experts Panel poll statements: A) Credible assumptions for inflation, GDP growth and primary budget deficits in Italy imply that either the Debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy would increase sharply if Italian interest rates on 10-year government debt remained at the November 30 level of around 7 percent or Italy would lose access to the bond market. B) Absent outside help to deal with runs, such as a pledge of fiscal support from Germany or an unlimited commitment by the ECB to buy bonds, there is no spending-and-tax plan Italy can announce that would be credible enough to hold its interest rates low enough to stabilize its Debt-to-GDP ratio.