In January this year, Senator Elizabeth Warren unveiled a proposal to tax the wealth of the richest 0.1% of Americans. The proposed legislation to tax households with a net worth of $50 million or more draws on analysis by one of our US panel of economic experts – Emmanuel Saez at Berkeley – showing that the richest 0.1% has seen its share of American wealth more than triple from 7% to 22% since the late 1970s. Saez and colleagues have also made calculations of the potential impact of Senator Warren’s proposed tax.
(a) Senator Warren’s proposed wealth tax would be much more difficult to enforce than existing federal taxes because of difficulties of valuation and the ways by which the wealthy can under-report their true wealth.
(b) If successfully enforced, Senator Warren’s proposed wealth tax would substantially decrease the share of wealth going to the top 0.1% of wealth-holders after 20 years.
(c) A public policy goal that could be accomplished with a well-enforced wealth tax could be equally accomplished with modifications to existing federal taxes – for example, revising the estate tax and/or capital gains tax.
Enforcement
Of our 42 experts, 39 participated in this survey. On the first statement, only one expressed no opinion; and weighted by each expert’s confidence in their response, 34% strongly agreed, 48% agreed, 9% were uncertain, and 9% disagreed. In other words, a substantial majority of respondents considered the wealth tax to be much more difficult to enforce than existing federal taxes.
Among the short comments that the experts are able to include when they participate in the survey, some pointed to past experiences of the challenges of enforcing a wealth tax. Steven Kaplan at Chicago stated that: ‘Where they have been tried, wealth taxes have not been successful’; and Darrell Duffie at Stanford added: The experience in France is apparently that this is a difficult form of tax to implement’.
Others who agreed with the statement commented on the difficulties of enforcement of wealth taxes compared with other taxes: Christopher Udry at Northwestern said they were: ‘Much more difficult than income taxes. The transition to appropriate reporting and record keeping for a wealth tax difficult but feasible.’ Larry Samuelson at Yale commented: ‘Wealth is notoriously difficult to tax. Enforcement problems are compounded by the distortions induced by legal tax evasion.’ And Anil Kashyap at Chicago pointed to the challenge of valuation: ‘Paintings, private businesses, long held property without obvious comparables in multiple locations – all hard to value’.
Others were a little less skeptical, including two who answered that they were uncertain: Abhijit Banerjee at MIT asked: ‘It will be more difficult to implement, but much more? There will be a one-time investment in learning, closing loopholes’; and Jonathan Levin at Stanford noted: ‘It would be difficult, but other parts of the tax code are also very complex to enforce’. Judith Chevalier at Yale, who agreed with the statement, added: ‘There are challenges. Not clear that they would be greater than for the estate tax.’
Aaron Edlin and Emmanuel Saez at Berkeley, both of whom disagreed with the statement, mentioned ways to make the wealth tax enforceable. Edlin commented on valuation issues: ‘One way to avoid under reporting with some assets is to allow anyone to buy at declared valuations. Another is large penalties’; and Saez referred to the resource requirements of tax collection: ‘enforcement success depends on resources devoted to set up a systematic way to measure wealth: information sharing, norms for valuations etc’.
Impact
On the second statement, three respondents expressed no opinion; and weighted by each expert’s confidence in their response, 19% strongly agreed, 54% agreed, 15% were uncertain, 6% disagreed, and 6% strongly disagreed – so just under three quarters agreeing that a successfully enforced wealth tax would substantially decrease the share of wealth going to the top 0.1% of wealth-holders.
In comments, Darrell Duffie said: ‘Conditional on successful enforcement, a simple calculation shows a substantial impact, assuming the revenues are redistributed naturally’;
Larry Samuelson calculated that ‘If successful, taxation at rates of two or three percent, compounded over twenty years, would significantly diminish the taxed wealth’; and Emmanuel Saez noted that ‘Wealth tax mechanically reduces returns to wealth at the top. Behavioral responses likely to magnify the effect. Effect builds up over time’.
Robert Shimer at Chicago, who agreed with the statement, added that: ‘It would also lead to much of the wealth moving offshore, despite provisions against that’; while Steven Kaplan, who strongly disagreed, argued that: ‘Pre-tax wealth inequality is driven by technology and globalization. Wealth taxes do not change those two forces’.
Respondents who were uncertain about the impact returned to the condition of successful enforcement. Richard Thaler at Chicago commented: ‘I don’t know how we get to “successfully enforced”. We can’t collect the estate tax, why would we be able to enforce this?’
Alternatives
On the third statement, two respondents expressed no opinion; and weighted by each expert’s confidence in their response, 13% strongly agreed, 47% agreed, 13% were uncertain, and 27% disagreed – so just under two thirds suggesting that alternative means could achieve the objectives of a wealth tax.
Among those who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, Michael Greenstone at Chicago said that: ‘a reform of existing taxes to match wealth tax however would need to do something about the stepping up of cost basis for estate taxes’. Richard Thaler concurred: ‘Yes, the estate tax is a sieve. Start with that? Get rid of step up to begin with’; as did Judith Chevalier: ‘To use only income and capital gains taxes, a key policy lever would be eliminating the capital gains basis step up at death’.
Among others who agreed with the statement, Daron Acemoglu at MIT suggested the following: ‘What would be most successful would be a combination of relatively high estate taxes combined with taxes on capital income’. In his comment on the first statement on enforceability, he noted that: ‘Taxing capital income at the same rate as labor income would be simpler, more effective and much less difficult to implement.’
Robert Hall at Stanford said: ‘We should focus on a progressive consumption tax structured as a value-added tax’; while William Nordhaus at Yale proposed: ‘Start with enforcing the current laws. This would be highly progressive move and should be at top of tax agenda, way at top’.
Among those who disagreed with alternative approaches, Emmanuel Saez commented that: ‘Estate and realized capital gains taxes come decades after wealth accumulation => wealth tax is a useful withholding tax back stop’; while Christopher Udry concluded that: ‘Unless the changes in capital gains and inheritance taxes were radical, they can’t match the time path of the wealth tax’.
Evidence
Pete Klenow at Stanford provided links to related research evidence: first, on the impact of US enforcement efforts to tax offshore accounts; second, a model of optimal progressive capital income taxes by Emmanuel Saez; and third, a comparison of the efficiency and distributional effects of wealth taxation and capital income taxation.
All comments made by the experts are in the full survey results.
Romesh Vaitilingam
@econromesh
April 2019
Question A:
Senator Warren’s proposed wealth tax would be much more difficult to enforce than existing federal taxes because of difficulties of valuation and the ways by which the wealthy can under-report their true wealth.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
If successfully enforced, Senator Warren’s proposed wealth tax would substantially decrease the share of wealth going to the top 0.1% of wealth-holders after 20 years.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
A public policy goal that could be accomplished with a well-enforced wealth tax could be equally accomplished with modifications to existing federal taxes – for example, revising the estate tax and/or capital gains tax.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Taxing capital income at the same rate as labor income would be simpler, more effective and much less difficult to implement.
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
It will be more difficult to implement, but much more? There will be a one-time investment in learning, closing loopholes.
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
There are challenges. Not clear that they would be greater than for the estate tax.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
The experience in France is apparently that this is a difficult form of tax to implement.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
One way to avoid under reporting with some assets is to allow anyone to buy at declared valuations. Another is large penalties.
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Where they have been tried, wealth taxes have not been successful.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Paintings, private businesses, long held property without obvious comparables in multiple locations -- all hard to value.
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
It would be difficult, but other parts of the tax code are also very complex to enforce.
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Enforcement success depends on resources devoted to set up a systematic way to measure wealth: information sharing, norms for valuations etc
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Wealth is notoriously difficult to tax. Enforcement problems are compounded by the distortions induced by legal tax evasion.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
Although estimates of compliance vary across countries.
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Question is unclear -- which existing federal taxes? Estate tax seems most relevant.
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Similar difficulty to the estate tax, except it has to be assessed on everyone.
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Don't like the Q. Define "much". And the main reason I think this is harder is that it would be annual. Also unclear who has to file.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
Much more difficult than income taxes. The transition to appropriate reporting and record keeping for a wealth tax difficult but feasible.
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
"successful enforcement" is very difficult to define and achieve. Hence uncertain.
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Conditional on successful enforcement, a simple calculation shows a substantial impact, assuming the revenues are redistributed naturally.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Just go make a spreadsheet, plug in numbers and compound it
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
i assume the question refers to pre-tax income.....
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Bad Question! The condition "if successfully enforced" makes no sense given that wealth among the very top is inherently hard to tax.
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Pre-tax wealth inequality is driven by technology and globalization. Wealth taxes do not change those two forces.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Given that countries like France abandoned it makes me think this is unachievable, so this is like "assume a can opener" on a desert island
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Depends on design and enforcement. US has poor record at enforcing tax laws, particularly for non-wage income, so much uncertainty here.
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Wealth tax mechanically reduces returns to wealth at the top. Behavioral responses likely to magnify the effect. Effect builds up over time
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
If successful, taxation at rates of two or three percent, compounded over twenty years, would significantly diminish the taxed wealth.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Depends a lot on enforcement.
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
It would also lead to much of the wealth moving offshore, despite provisions against that
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
I don't know how we get to "successfully enforced". We can't collect the estate tax, why would we be able to enforce this?
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question C Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
What would be most successful would be a combination of relatively high estate taxes combined with taxes on capital income.
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
To use only income and capital gains taxes, a key policy lever would be eliminating the capital gains basis step up at death.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Mostly but with some moderate differences.
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
a reform of existing taxes to match wealth tax however would need to do something about the stepping up of cost basis for estate taxes
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
We should focus on a progressive consumption tax structured as a value-added tax.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Another bad question. This is a classic topic in fundamental tax reform, about which (I suspect) few Panel members have expertise.
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Could be done with a capital gains tax, if assessed every year, rather than at time of sale.
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Start with enforcing the current laws. This would be highly progressive move and should be at top of tax agenda, way at top.
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Estate and realized capital gains taxes come decades after wealth accumulation => wealth tax is a useful withholding tax back stop
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Too broad. True of some goals, but not all plausible ones. Capital gains taxes and wealth taxes have a number of different effects.
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Depends a lot on how effective those other taxes are, plus and they are not quite the same.
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
This is similar to the estate tax, although the timing is different.
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Yes, the estate tax is a sieve. Start with that? Get rid of step up to begin with.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
Unless the changes in capital gains and inheritance taxes were radical, they can't match the time path of the wealth tax.
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