Question A:
The trend of consolidation in the US banking sector will lead to fewer, but more profitable, mega-banks with over $250 billion in assets dominating the market.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
The current liquidity and capital regulations are inadequate to address run risks of banks in a digital era.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
A "trend" is not a cause. Banks are becoming larger and immune to competition & entry because of regulatory barriers, protection, and fixed costs of regulation. Not obviously more profitable however. Regulated utilities aren't always profitable. Some activity can move to fintech.
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Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Wenxin Du |
HBS | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
The trend has been clear. This may be related to a mix of scale network effects and increases in fixed costs related to IT and regulatory compliance. Regulation has been lighter for smaller banks, but apparently that has not stopped the consolidation.
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Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Eugene Fama |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Depends what dominating means. Private credit has expanded markedly to take on some of the lending banks would otherwise do.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
consolidation is likely to continue, but whether profitability rises is less certain. a lot of competition will come from outside the banking industry
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Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
It seems unlikely that we will have a wave of M&A among mega-banks. Antitrust issues are an obvious factor
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Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
Small banks enjoy substantial subsidies, which would be dissipated in case of large consolidation lowering profitability gains. Consolidating small banks may have little impact on competition between large banks, and between banks and shadow banks, limiting the effect on profits.
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Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
Current trends indeed suggest fewer large banks. Whether this continues, and whether these would be "mega banks" is less clear.
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Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
GSIBs have regulatory advantages
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Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paola Sapienza |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
I could see a consolidation wave resulting in more mid-size banks, with assets under $100B or $50B. With 4000+ US banks, there is lots of scope for consolidation all along the bank size distribution.
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Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not sure what "digital era" has to do with it. Inadequate capital has caused runs for centuries. "regulations" are not "inadequate," we have hundreds of thousands of pages of those, and Silicon Valley Bank. Capital is inadequate. With capital you don't need regulations.
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Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Problems in supervision under the current regulations are part of the problem. Delayed recognition of book losses in hold to maturity assets is problematic. The treatment of uninsured demand deposits as core deposits also needs updating.
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Wenxin Du |
HBS | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
In 2023, the failures of three large "regional" banks triggered runs that caused the government to bail out uninsured depositors. Capital and liquidity regulations were found to be inadequate. New regulations are therefore being proposed.
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Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Eugene Fama |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
Run betas have increased given that social media allows for faster transmission of information. Exhibit 1 is SVB. I prefer a restructuring of the system to allow for narrow banks rather than bolting a new fender on an already rusting car.
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Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
The runs on SVB and others in the spring of 2023 suggest this is the case, whether because of inadequate capital requirements or less than competent regulators.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
You need supervision too and that is what failed at SVB.
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Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
Communication styles unique to the digital era likely increased the 'speed' of the SVB run. However, it seems unlikely that an extra few days would have solved SVB's problems.
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Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
Liquidity regs are likely adequate to deal with liquidity runs on banks with ILLIQUID assets. They do not prevent franchise value solvency runs on banks with LIQUID assets. Capital regs can do so, but they are likely to small or poorly implemented and enforced.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
One example: how interest-rate risk is treated in capital regulation is not adequate
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Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
Most bank runs follow from insolvency rather than illiquidity, but even for a pure liquidity, the banking sector does not have sufficient insurance and liquidity to back uninsured deposits, even the amount outside the largest, systemically important banks.
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Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
Liquidity requirements are based on historical shocks, as the nature of the industry changes so will the sensitivity of deposits to shocks.
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Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paola Sapienza |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Deposit flight has become a matter of minutes rather than hours of days. Regulation and resolution authority needs to adapt to this technological reality.
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Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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