Laws that limit the resale of tickets for entertainment and sports events make potential audience members for those events worse off on average.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Third degree price discrimination can make consumers on average better off or worse off.
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
True in an aggregate way, but distributional implications so not necessarily true for even majority of people.
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
You can find equilibria where allowing resale makes some worse off. Of course it is interesting why the venue doesn't charge the mkt price.
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Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
Without controls, scalpers may buy up all tickets and sell them at high prices. High income people gain, but low income people lose.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Sounds like there are possible gains from trade. Although I'm no expert, I don't see the negative externality caused by opening this market.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Free trade leads to more efficient outcomes in general, but gains from allowing resale would be distributed unequally
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Claudia Goldin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
It all depends on how the tickets were initially sold. The question is why there was excess demand in the first place.
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Of course, the big mystery is the strong tendency to underprice tickets at the box office. Correcting that tendency would be socially good.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Classic example in which good (tickets) are not allocated to those who value them most. Only exception:ticket-holder's identity matters.
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Yes, though the gains in allocative efficiency could be mitigated by transaction and queuing costs.
-see background information here |
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Edward Lazear |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Since no-resale rules may affect price structures, this may not be as simple as it seems.
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Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Zingales |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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