Tesla shareholders are likely to benefit substantially from the decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery to void Elon Musk's $56 billion remuneration package.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
It's highly uncertain whether Tesla shareholders will benefit, but the shareholders of other tech companies may benefit from the signal the decision sends about acceptable compensation policies.
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John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Tesla's stratospheric stock value depends on the belief that Musk will deliver magic, not selling cars. The package was not cash today, but options granted before stock rose, reward for performance. Denying ex ante maybe, but ex post welching on deals is not good.
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Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Wenxin Du |
HBS | Bio/Vote History | ||
Tesla stock down 2% in the after hour trading following the news, which suggests that a cut in executive pay is not necessarily good news for equity holders.
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
The option grant was designed to induce Musk to drive the market value of Tesla equity to a much higher level. Now that he (arguably) has done that, the shareholders (other than Musk) are being given a windfall gain by voiding the options.
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Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eugene Fama |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
The number seems large, but I don't know how one can tell if it is too large.
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Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
A 2% drop in the stock price doesn't seem like a big deal - so not "substantial". What is more interesting is Tesla potentially moving incorporation to Texas. Currently, Delaware has near monopoly over corporate registrations. Competition is on the way.
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David Hirshleifer |
USC | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
Governance at Tesla seems problematic.
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Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Tesla shareholders voted in favor in 2018. Stock dropped when opinion was announced indicating a loss of value. Will be a distraction if not value destroyer going forward.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
The greatest potential benefit to shareholders would be if this caused Tesla to improve its overall corporate governance. However, at this point that does not seem likely.
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Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Bio/Vote History | ||
There's the direct effect of the renumeration, but then there's the indirect effect of the signal from the event. Not clear what the net effect will be.
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Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Even if the process of awarding the pay package was flawed, as the court seems to have argued, this does not mean that the award was in conflict with the interests shareholders. The stock price also didn't move much, so likely a non-event for shareholder value.
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Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
The Delaware court, with more information than us, voided the pay based on existing protections for minority investors against conflicted boards & deceptive disclosures, helping investors in Tesla (& all US stocks). Mature Tesla may be better without Musk but that is irrelevant.
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Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
Absence a friction, courts intervening into market outcomes tend to make people worse off.
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Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paola Sapienza |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
This corresponds to 9.5% of stock market capitalization, but more importantly, the court has pointed the finger to board members who are too close to management, highlighting conflict of interest. I think this is a useful warning
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Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
Judging by Tesla's stock-price reaction to the decision (down slightly), stockholders do not perceive a benefit. I would not argue otherwise.
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Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
Maybe some of the incentive effects (to the extent there are any) have happened already.
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Amir Sufi |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Redistribution from entrenched shareholder to diffuse shareholders. signals better corporate governance. Reduce impact of erratic behavior of one large shareholder on entire company.
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Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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