A market that allows payment for human kidneys should be established on a trial basis to help extend the lives of patients with kidney disease.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not enough info to answer. Not in favor of a kidney market that sells to highest bidder. Other ideas maybe. Question is not actionable.
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
That would mean valuing people's lives by their incomes. We already do that but moving further in that direction seems wrong.
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
It is important that the market is "well regulated" in order to avoid abuse and exploitation of the vulnerables.
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
This certainly may have unintended consequences but it is hard to fault attempting to create more supply.
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Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Under strong governance that mitigates exploitation, this market may save lives on mutually consenting terms.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Dangerous ground, but a well-regulated experiment could be beneficial. Payments to fill out donor cards might increase supply, for example
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
A market with or without subsidies for low income patients?
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Hard to know because we don't have much of an understanding of why people make organ gifts.
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
I'd like to see it but I'm not sure the public is ready. Also would insurance cover this? Would people be able to top up (presumably)?
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Would improve allocative efficiency but means- and health-conditioned vouchers would presumably have to be used to address ethical concerns.
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
There is no reason to block this voluntary exchange. There may be unique challenges in applying laws against fraud, but nothing too hard.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Perhaps experiments in different regimes better idea.
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
We need to rationalize our organ allocation mechanism, but a market is not the only way, and is not obviously the best way.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
How to deal with donors who don't understand risks, increased incentives to steal & import, perceived inequities...? Not simple.
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Experiments seem valuable here, using health outcomes as our metric. Matching donors and recipients based in part on payment may be helpful.
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
The biggest impact would be to increase kidney supply, so few obvious losers from this policy
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
It would surely save lives of those with kidney disease. It would probably have unintended consequences as well.
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
How should we incorporate the fact that nearly all non-economists hate this idea? Do we declare them wrong and proceed?
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
As an economist, I strongly agree that there would be tremendous gains. But I'm uncertain of the appropriate bounds on market transactions.
-see background information here -see background information here |