US

Short Positions

Question A:

Bans on the short selling of financial securities, such as stocks and government bonds, would lead to prices that are further, on average, from their fundamental values.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

Requiring investors to disclose short positions in a stock at the equivalent threshold as they are required to do for long positions would improve the accuracy of stock prices.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Both theoretically and empirically, there are reasons to expect that shortselling can lead to bubbles and other price distortions.
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Baicker
Katherine Baicker
University of Chicago Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
in general yes, but there are exception due to short squeezes and predatory short selling
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
My guess is there's a literature on this, but I don't know it.
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Short-sale bans (a) leave optimists less constrained than pessimists and (b) reduce market liquidity. These both cause price distortions.
-see background information here
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Short selling is one important way to prevent prices from being too out of whack on the high side.
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee
Chicago
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
This is what the research seems to say.
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
There is little serious research on this question. Research often ignores differences in beliefs, an obvious source of shorting behavior.
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Short-selling provided information. The sub-prime crisis might have been less severe it it weas easier to short mortgage-backed securities.
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Short sellers moderate speculative episodes. Short sellers have occasionally revealed fraud (Enron).
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Ban on shorts means prices do not reflect the views and information of pessimistic investors. Possible exception is during a short squeeze.
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
without short selling prices are set by the most optimistic traders yielding a winner's curse.
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Transparency should help, but there are various complications related to herding and complex inferences less sophisticated traders can draw.
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Baicker
Katherine Baicker
University of Chicago Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
outcome depends on details
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Uncertain
10
Bio/Vote History
Reveals price-relevant information about who is shorting but reduces the incentive to short. The net effect on price accuracy is unclear.
-see background information here
-see background information here
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Shorts may fear companies’ withholding information which discourages shorts. Withholding also lowers the informativeness of prices.
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
It would make it even easier to squeeze the shorts.
Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee
Chicago
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Disclosures cut both ways
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Having large short positions may lead to market power, justifying this rule.
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Would likely lead to less shorting. Squeezes, who knows? Sometimes prominent shorts campaign against their target (eg Einhorn and Lehman).
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
One would expect the additional information to be valuable in the market.
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
No obvious reason for current asymmetry of treatment between investor accumulating large position and one amassing large short interest.
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
I don't see offhand why there should be an asymmetry in disclosure rules long v short but whether it affects prices is uncertain.
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History