Question A:
Bans on the short selling of financial securities, such as stocks and government bonds, would lead to prices that are further, on average, from their fundamental values.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Requiring investors to disclose short positions in a stock at the equivalent threshold as they are required to do for long positions would improve the accuracy of stock prices.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Both theoretically and empirically, there are reasons to expect that shortselling can lead to bubbles and other price distortions.
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
in general yes, but there are exception due to short squeezes and predatory short selling
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
My guess is there's a literature on this, but I don't know it.
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Short-sale bans (a) leave optimists less constrained than pessimists and (b) reduce market liquidity. These both cause price distortions.
-see background information here |
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Short selling is one important way to prevent prices from being too out of whack on the high side.
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
This is what the research seems to say.
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
There is little serious research on this question. Research often ignores differences in beliefs, an obvious source of shorting behavior.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Short-selling provided information. The sub-prime crisis might have been less severe it it weas easier to short mortgage-backed securities.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
Short sellers moderate speculative episodes. Short sellers have occasionally revealed fraud (Enron).
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Ban on shorts means prices do not reflect the views and information of pessimistic investors. Possible exception is during a short squeeze.
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
without short selling prices are set by the most optimistic traders yielding a winner's curse.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Transparency should help, but there are various complications related to herding and complex inferences less sophisticated traders can draw.
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
outcome depends on details
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Reveals price-relevant information about who is shorting but reduces the incentive to short. The net effect on price accuracy is unclear.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Shorts may fear companies’ withholding information which discourages shorts. Withholding also lowers the informativeness of prices.
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
It would make it even easier to squeeze the shorts.
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Disclosures cut both ways
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Having large short positions may lead to market power, justifying this rule.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Would likely lead to less shorting. Squeezes, who knows? Sometimes prominent shorts campaign against their target (eg Einhorn and Lehman).
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
One would expect the additional information to be valuable in the market.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
No obvious reason for current asymmetry of treatment between investor accumulating large position and one amassing large short interest.
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
I don't see offhand why there should be an asymmetry in disclosure rules long v short but whether it affects prices is uncertain.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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