The former head of the Transportation Security Administration is correct in arguing that randomizing airport “security procedures encountered by passengers (additional upper-torso pat-downs, a thorough bag search, a swab test of carry-ons, etc.), while not subjecting everyone to the full gamut" would make it "much harder for terrorists to learn how to evade security procedures."
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Giving TSA officers discretion is a good idea; simply randomizing some procedures does not prevent terrorists learning
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
I am not sure that this is an economics question! I can't quantify the speed of terrorist learning....
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Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
Would like to see some evidence. Theory is not clear on rules vs. discretion.
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
"Randomization" is rarely random in practice, often for good reasons. If the search intensity is the same, how is it safer to search fewer?
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Then why not send mutliple terrorists to a flight? A subset would make it randomly through. Profiling is more effective than randomization.
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Claudia Goldin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
It would probably make it harder for a terrorist to learn the procedure being used but it would make getting through the system easier.
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
so long as terrorists aren't too nuts to be deterred
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
would full set of potential procedures be public? frequency of testing matters too. would reduce travel hassle but could increase risks
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
I don't think economists have any professional expertise in this area. Anti-terrorist policy should be evidence-based, not Aristotelian.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Unconditional randomization is dumb. Randomization CONDITIONAL on a person's characteristics w enormous penalties for dangerous items: yes.
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
This won't stop terrorists who are both intelligent and suicidal, as were the 9/11 guys.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Predictability does seem unwise, but I am uncertain about the most efficient ways to deliver safety.
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Edward Lazear |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Too complex an issue to speak to without having researched it more thoroughly. I don't feel that I know the data or arguments.
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Seems consistent with many studies that emphasize random audits as a valuable way to catch or deter bad behavior.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
While this sounds plausible, I don't feel I know enough to have an opinion.
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Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
This depends on the details. If the methods are secret then using them rarely will make them harder to discern in which case, yes.
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Is there any theory or evidence on this point? Is it an issue about which economists have any special insight?
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Of course mixed strategy is better. Most of what TSA does is just barn door closing or for show. Reinforcing the cockpit door did a lot.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Zingales |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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