Past experience suggests that economic sanctions do little to deter the target countries from their course of action.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
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Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
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27%
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Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
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![]() Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
This is true for limited sanctions being imposed on Russia. Much more comprehensive sanctions as in South Africa or Iran would be effective.
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![]() Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not a good experiment, but sanctions appear effective sometimes, e.g., Iran, South Africa.
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![]() Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
I think a part of what made Iran come to bargaining table has to do with the sanctions, though I have no way to prove this.
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![]() Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
Sanctions bite often only with a long delay and the effectiveness depends on the circumanstances. (South Africa and Iran vs. North Korea)
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![]() Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Janet Currie |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
I waver between uncertain and agree. Much depends on the form of the sanctions, the behavior they're designed to deter, etc.
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![]() Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
often do little, but can deter if significant and applied effectively
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![]() Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
"Course of action" is vague. Sanctions & their threat alter the calculus by raising costs & thus affect decisions. but not a cure all
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not acquainted with the evidence.
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![]() Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
My sense is that economic sanctions were important in ending apartheid in South Africa, and are leading Iran to negotiate with the West.
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![]() Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Depends on country, its trade, its politics. Also, sanctions that are initially apparently ineffective can gradually undermine a regime.
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![]() Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Sanctions are signals. Putin would be surprised if NATO said nothing about Crimea, and might read it as a green light to be more aggressive.
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![]() Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Hard to design & sustain in a way that ends up only harming the offender. Better to boycott the world cup in Russia +embarass FIFA too!
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![]() Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
It surely works sometimes (e.g. against the Apartheid regime). Restrictions on Odious Debt could also help, though NA for Russia today.
-see background information here |
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![]() Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
I'm no expert on this, but Int. Relations literature seems to conclude sanctions often don't work that well.
-see background information here |
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![]() Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Referring to economic or political sanctions.
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![]() Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
We have evidence both ways - sanctions of Myanmar and North Korea have accomplished little, while sanctions on Iran may be useful.
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![]() José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
I'm sure there are exceptions, but not many.
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![]() Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Effectiveness must depend on the openness of the target economy and the uniformity of the application of sanctions
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![]() Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
I don't trust my memory to run a mental regression with sanctions on the right hand side. In principle, there should be sanctions that work
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![]() Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
The evidence is that sanctions can be effective, particularly when the goal is limited.
-see background information here |