Question A:
Consumers will be better off, on balance, if European cities treat firms that provide ride-sharing platforms (such as Uber) as substantively different from taxi firms, and thus not necessarily warranting the same regulation.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Assuming that taxi and ride-sharing companies were treated as substantively similar — including requirements that they operate on an equal footing regarding safety, insurance and taxation — letting ride-sharing services compete without restrictions on prices or routes would raise consumer welfare.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
Regardless of how ride-sharing services are treated, existing regulations for traditional taxi firms in many European cities harm consumers by limiting competition.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Philippe Aghion |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
Uber provides a different kind of service to regular taxi services that helps consumers. Leck of worker's rights may be a problem though.
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
It depends on what is meant by regulation. Ride-sharing platforms ought to be regulated, but some of current taxi regulations are harmful
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Richard Baldwin |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Uber offers more choice - consumers always benefit from choice. The fact so many choose Uber means it is a better service for so many.
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
Taxi regulation could be adjusted to the new business model; a level playing field is needed.
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
I cannot answer the question before assessing the justification and efficiency of existing regulation.
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
The main improvement is to do away with the license system that causes barriers to entry. Should comply with safety, insurance and taxation.
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
Barriers for entering the taxi market and collusion among taxi companies generate substantial rents in this market
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
An excessively different regulation will unnecessarily reduce competition between two substitute services.
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
I agree but existing owners of taxi licencesnshouldb be compensated on a scale depending on the lucence age
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
Most customers will face lower prices. Where drivers make big investments (e.g. London) quality might decline meaning some consumers lose.
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Martin Hellwig |
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods | Bio/Vote History | ||
The meaning of "same" and "different" is unclear. There are similarities as well as differences. How releveant are they?
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not sure that differential regulation good; there is scope for improvement in taxi regulation though.
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Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
Exempting ride sharing services from existing regulations would put taxi firms at an imposed disadvantage, undermining efficiency.
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Per Krusell |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Uber is more than info society service as it sets price&driver pay, so treating as transport w/minimum quality reg makes sense.
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
The term regulation is vague. If by regulation we mean ensuring driver qualifications and car safety, these have to have a unified standard
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Taxis are excessively regulated in many cities, so increased competition is desirable. But regulation also has a role in protecting consumer
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Bio/Vote History | ||
In many European countries taxi services are over-regulated and too expansive
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not the same regulation-->different products. Uber and London black cab qualitatively different. Black cabs also rightly get privileges.
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
Given the arrival of new technologies it would make sense to think about the design the whole transport system starting from scratch.
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
New technology changes the nature and extent of market failure. (De)regulation should reflect that.
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
Uber etc are monopolization plays; where taxi regulation works today, as in most European cities, the long-run impact may be negative
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Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
The business of these firms is not substantively different from taxis, so I don't see why they should be treated differently.
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Bio/Vote History | ||
Question is ambiguous. Regulation should be relaxed but the same for all operators.
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Philippe Aghion |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
This seems an area where competition would be beneficial.
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
A positive effect on consumer surplus seems clear; on the producer side, there are winners and losers
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Richard Baldwin |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Competition is always good for consumers, so they clearly gain. Taxi companies of course hate it - nobody likes having to compete!
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
Ride-sharing platforms need to be regulated to avoid monopoly power related to large network effects.
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
With a level playing field I agree that the new form of competition brings in benefits. The legacy of past licensing has to be address, howe
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
An application of classical microeconomic theory. Taxes on taxis should adapt.
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
conditional on the caveat above
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Martin Hellwig |
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods | Bio/Vote History | ||
There is a question whether such entry would not simply induce traditional suppliers to exit.
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Per Krusell |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Classic concerns about open entry mitigated with online platforms. Not letting them compete on equal footing likely violates EU law.
-see background information here |
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
More competition is desirable. In this scenario Uber's only advantage is its superior technology and organisation, likely to be short-lived.
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Bio/Vote History | ||
It would break up tacit collusion from existing large companies
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Licensed taxis should retain privileges (bus/taxi lanes, authorisation to pick up passengers hailing them on the street...) and compete.
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
Aggregate consumer welfare should go up, although some consumers might be worse off.
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
Imposing restrictions on a particular sub-set of the market is unfair and hurts consumers.
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question C Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Philippe Aghion |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
Trade-off of worker'w rights and consumers benefits is a difficult one.
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
Leaving aside potential congestion and environmental concerns, the quick rise of (among others) Uber indicates that competition was limited
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Richard Baldwin |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Many taxi regulations help taxi firms and harm consumers - they restrict choice and keep prices high. It's a classic producer union.
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
Some form of regulation may well be justified over the medium run even if it limits competition
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
obvious
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
For historical reasons the objective function in taxi regulation was related to tax revenue rather than consumer welfare
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
The licencing system with a predetermined number of licences should be replaced with one that only controls safety and similar stadards
|
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
With qualification that in some cities (London) drivers invest in quality, and tougher price competition might diminish these investments.
|
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Martin Hellwig |
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods | Bio/Vote History | ||
Key issues are price regulation and entry regulation. We need significant empirical information to assess their effects on consumers.
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
Welfare is affected by two effects, reduced competition (a minus), and increased safety/reliability (a plus). The sum is thus indeterminate.
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Per Krusell |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Entry regulation mostly harmful. But there clearly is a case for (minimum) quality regulation, though some quality competition can be good.
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
But some of them also help consumers by imposing standards. The net effect depends on the details.
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Bio/Vote History | ||
It does not apply to all countries but some do have very strong restrictions and not enough consumer protection
|
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Licensing to confirm competences and confer corresponding privileges OK, but not to create rents through barriers to entry.
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Heterogeneous across countries. Density of cabs noticeably different across cities. Should be discussed together with congestion charge, etc
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
The picture is mixed; some cities have been captured by the taxi lobby, as in the US; others boast cheap, safe, plentiful taxi services...
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||||
Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
Restrictive regulations relating to pricing or quantity supplied are rarely a good idea unless there is a clear market failure.
|
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|