Rather than using second-round runoffs to settle elections in which no candidate wins a first-round majority, the overall preferences of the electorate would be better reflected by using a single round with ranked-choice voting, in which voters are instructed to rank all of the candidates.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
34%
13%
2%
13%
21%
11%
6%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
5%
23%
36%
17%
18%
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are complicated trade-offs here. Multi-rounds take more time and so attention but allow attention to focus on the finalists.
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 Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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it sounds right to this non expert, but one should never forget the Arrow impossibility theorem
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 Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is not my expertise. I am not a political scientist
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 Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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More easy to manipulate. Coordination may lead to the worst choices
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 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Sergei Guriev |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Uses more information for final choice. Better especially when more than two candidates attract sizeable first preferences.
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 Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The ranking procedure may give undue weight to the group of similar-positioned candidates (doubles).
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 Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Costas Meghir |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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With ranking, question is how you aggregate. I prefer single transferable vote: lowest in first count is eliminated, new count, etc.
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 Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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No voting system is perfect, but requiring voters to rank all of the candidates is too complicated.
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 Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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as initial expression of preferences, ranked system likely more informative. for final formation of gov other institutions play a role too
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 Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ranked-choice voting is optimal but takes time to get used to. Better start ASAP
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 Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Simplicity is key for democratic voting systems and I doubt most voters understand how ranked-choice voting really works.
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 John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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