Question A:

Letting publicly traded European firms report earnings annually rather than quarterly would lead their executives to place more weight on long-term issues in their investments and other decisions.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

A switch from quarterly to annual earnings reports would, on net, benefit shareholders of European firms.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
This is an interesting trade-off. I'm afraid I am not up on the literature enough to express a meaningful opinion.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Internal metrics for management and the board will still be generated monthly so the frequency of external reporting has very little impact.
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
I could be, but I would want to know first whether continuous information disclosure is feasible (report as booked). More info is better...
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Compulsary disclosure (if enforced) leads to lower asymmetric information.
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Evidence suggests quarterly too frequent; half-yearly may be about right
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
The point is that Board-level brain-time needed to justify volatile results is reduced to an -arguably- more reasonable time span.
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Strongly Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
My view is not based on research but on beliefs formed by talking to businesses.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
9
Bio/Vote History
Conceivable, but evidence is quite mixed. Recent studies for Singapore&UK say no. Some studies show more emphasis on acc numbers w/ Q report
-see background information here
-see background information here
-see background information here
-see background information here
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Not my specialty. I would expect source of funding rather than frequency of reporting to be more important in promoting long-term thinking
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Many projects take more than a year to pay off and it is not clear that such a reform would do much other than reduce incentives to perform.
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
The change would heighten incentive problems around the annual results even if it eased the quarterly issues. Net effect unclear.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
I can't see any good arguments for this change in reporting frequency having any positive effect on managerial decision making.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
This is an interesting trade-off. I am afraid I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about this to give a meaningful opinion.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
This would reduce corporate Governance, reducing firm profits and growth, to the detriment of shareholders, workers and the public.
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Depends on their time horizon.
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
But could be scope for informed insiders to exploit long reporting interval at expense of uninformed shareholders.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Board-level brain time is redirected to longer horizons - which on balance may benefit shareholders.
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
I just don’t think it would matter much.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Even w/ neg on invest, there are offsets. Q rep increases liquidity in secondary mkts&improves monitoring. Quite a few benefits from Q rep.
-see background information here
-see background information here
-see background information here
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Same answer as to (A), with the added proviso that long-term thinking may be good for society but not necessarily for all shareholders
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Shareholders of such firms need more than annual visibility of corporate performance
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Shareholders are better off having access to regular information on the companies they own.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History