Question A:
Letting publicly traded European firms report earnings annually rather than quarterly would lead their executives to place more weight on long-term issues in their investments and other decisions.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
20%
6%
8%
6%
26%
32%
2%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
13%
9%
34%
40%
4%
Question B:
A switch from quarterly to annual earnings reports would, on net, benefit shareholders of European firms.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
20%
6%
6%
18%
34%
16%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
12%
26%
41%
21%
0%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is an interesting trade-off. I'm afraid I am not up on the literature enough to express a meaningful opinion.
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 Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Internal metrics for management and the board will still be generated monthly so the frequency of external reporting has very little impact.
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 Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I could be, but I would want to know first whether continuous information disclosure is feasible (report as booked). More info is better...
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 Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Compulsary disclosure (if enforced) leads to lower asymmetric information.
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 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Evidence suggests quarterly too frequent; half-yearly may be about right
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 Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The point is that Board-level brain-time needed to justify volatile results is reduced to an -arguably- more reasonable time span.
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 Per Krusell |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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My view is not based on research but on beliefs formed by talking to businesses.
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 Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Conceivable, but evidence is quite mixed. Recent studies for Singapore&UK say no. Some studies show more emphasis on acc numbers w/ Q report
-see background information here -see background information here -see background information here -see background information here |
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 Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not my specialty. I would expect source of funding rather than frequency of reporting to be more important in promoting long-term thinking
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 Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Many projects take more than a year to pay off and it is not clear that such a reform would do much other than reduce incentives to perform.
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 John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The change would heighten incentive problems around the annual results even if it eased the quarterly issues. Net effect unclear.
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||||
 Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I can't see any good arguments for this change in reporting frequency having any positive effect on managerial decision making.
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 Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This is an interesting trade-off. I am afraid I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about this to give a meaningful opinion.
|
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Depends on their time horizon.
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Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This would reduce corporate Governance, reducing firm profits and growth, to the detriment of shareholders, workers and the public.
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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|
||||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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|
||||
|
Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
But could be scope for informed insiders to exploit long reporting interval at expense of uninformed shareholders.
|
||||
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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||||
|
Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Board-level brain time is redirected to longer horizons - which on balance may benefit shareholders.
|
||||
|
Per Krusell |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
I just don’t think it would matter much.
|
||||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Even w/ neg on invest, there are offsets. Q rep increases liquidity in secondary mkts&improves monitoring. Quite a few benefits from Q rep.
-see background information here -see background information here -see background information here |
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Same answer as to (A), with the added proviso that long-term thinking may be good for society but not necessarily for all shareholders
|
||||
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
|
Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Shareholders of such firms need more than annual visibility of corporate performance
|
||||
|
Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Shareholders are better off having access to regular information on the companies they own.
|
||||
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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