Question A:
The lower willingness of private firms to go public, combined with the increased number of publicly traded firms being taken private over the last 25 years, is measurably net negative for economic growth.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
All else equal, reducing regulatory barriers (including reporting requirements such as Sarbanes Oxley 404) to public listing would substantially increase the share of publicly traded firms in the economy.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
The lack of transparency about unlisted private firms' financial performance substantially hinders the efficiency of the allocation of capital.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Public firms have better access to credit and their actions may be more transparent, but it is not clear whether having fewer public firms has become a major factor in economic growth. Public firms may be subject to more short-termist pressure as well.
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 Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The balance of public and private markets may change over time.
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are too many factors at work to say this.
-see background information here |
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are pluses and minuses to being public and none are fully understood. For example, public firms may be more concerned with short term financial results or accounting instead of economic profits.
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Loss of investment opportunities for the broader public is a significant negative.
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The risk-sharing function of public equity allows firms to raise large amounts of capital efficiently.
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Economic growth in the U.S. and world has been solid. Private equity tends to improve productivity.
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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see the explanation following the next two questions
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Parag Pathak |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The answer depends on why this has happened. Improvements in private equity should help growth. Worsening conditions for publicly-traded companies hurts growth.
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 Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I'm not clear on this one at all. Maybe startups' strategy shift from IPO to acquisition is somewhat harmful, but beyond that I just don't know.
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ivan Werning |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This sounds reasonable but I do not know the specific evidence supporting or contradicting it.
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Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But there is no obvious implication that this way of getting them listed is desirable
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Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In just about any activity where there is entry at the margin, lowering the cost of entry increases the quantity of entry.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But that does not mean it's a good idea
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Excessive regulation has reduced attraction to list.
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It is easy to blame regulation but other important factors are taxes, the concentration of wealth, and the technological improvements in organizing that wealth as private equity.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Economics 101. Regulation and costs to being public appear to have increased over time.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are plenty of reporting burdens that public firms face, not clear that they are all constructive
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Parag Pathak |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Other factors, such as increases in private capital and the increased importance of intangible assets also lead to the reduction in the number of public forms, so it is difficult to assess the importance of regulatory barriers.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Reporting requirements are costly but associated enforcement by government and penalties lower agency costs.
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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If you reduce the cost of doing something that is beneficial to someone, they will do more of it.
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ivan Werning |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Question C Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Holding constant the wide distribution of investors typical of public firms, this is obvious. But private firms have far more concentrated ownership, with a substantial degree of direct shareholder oversight.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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With apologies for the self-reference, this paper demonstrates the benefits of SEC mandatory disclosure rules.
-see background information here |
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The lack of transparency of large private firms is bad for many reasons including that we don't know about the environmental damage they are causing
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Transparency is necessary for the market to efficiently aggregate information.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The lack of transparency definitely hinders the allocation and judging the quantitative impact is hard. This is the downside of the rise in the share of private firms.
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Parag Pathak |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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When corporations can hide their business plans, it allows them to have strategies that are illegal or would be made illegal if governments realized what was happening. Investments in these business models are inefficient and wrong.
-see background information here |
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I would defer strongly to my accounting colleagues here.
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ivan Werning |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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