Question A:
There is no perfect voting system. That is, no voting system can ensure that the winner will be the person who best represents voters’ wishes, including how intensely they favor or disfavor each candidate.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
One clear defect of a winner-take-all election with 3 or more candidates, and with each voter choosing only one candidate, is that a candidate who is strongly disliked by a majority, but strongly liked by a minority, can beat a candidate who is liked by a majority and disliked by relatively few.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Just another day's work for Ken Arrow
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
Condorcet paradox
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
This is a 1950 theorem of Kenneth Arrow. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" Journal of Political Economy.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
especially with lots of candidates
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
This is well worked out theoretically. But it doesn't mean voting isn't better than the alternatives! (Answer by Andrew B. Hall)
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
We know from Arrow's impossibility theorem that no voting system can aggregate preferences perfectly even if people vote honestly.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Ken Arrow actually has proved a theorem to this effect (that holds under pretty general conditions).
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
Arrow's theorem implies there is no perfect system using only ordinal preferences. Cardinal systems are strategically manipulable.
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
There is extensive research and impossibility results showing that there is no perfect voting system.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
However alternatives that allow for multiple votes per person can achieve outcomes that better reflect intensity of opinions.
-see background information here |
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
The one exception is dictatorship, so there is only one voter.
-see background information here |
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Arrow proved this. Like asking if 2+2=4.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
strategic voting behavior can help to reduce the problem.
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
The issue is discussed nicely in the popular article I link, even though the specific polling status of the candidates is now very dated!
-see background information here |
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
I would say "imperfection" not defect. Compared to what, though is the question, as there is no perfect system ...
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
but isn't it fun to watch it happen?
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Strategic voting should in principle help, but in practice coordination failures clearly do occur. This is one reason why runoffs are a good
-see background information here |
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
46% of people rank 3 candidates A,C,B. ( A first, B last.) 44% rank them B,C,A. 10% rank them C,B,A. Then A wins,but C may be better.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
The words liked and disliked are too ambiguous but with my interpretation the answer is obvious.
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Looks like that may be happening this year.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Nonetheless, this does not absolve the U.S. citizens if we elect Trump!
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
A defect, but alternatives that try to fix it like run-off elections or transferable voting, have drawbacks as well.
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
This is a well-known defect of plurality rule
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Single transferable vote would overcome this problem.
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Winner-take-all elections with multiple candidates are fertile ground for generating perverse results.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Assumes a one-round, plurality wins system.
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
I hesitate only because I'm not sure whether this is necessarily a defect. The rest of the claim is true.
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Yes, stuff can happen. Follows from question 1.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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