Question A:
Clearing the market for surgical face masks using prices is detrimental to the public good.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
19%
2%
2%
12%
14%
37%
14%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
4%
13%
9%
48%
25%
Question B:
Laws to prevent high prices for essential goods in short supply in a crisis would raise social welfare.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
19%
0%
2%
23%
33%
21%
2%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
6%
30%
29%
31%
4%
Question C:
Governments should buy essential medical supplies at what would have been the market price and redistribute according to need rather than ability to pay.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
19%
2%
0%
2%
23%
47%
7%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
0%
3%
19%
67%
11%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Market signals are important. But in crisis, public solidarity is critical. Allocating vital equipment to the rich rich would destroy it.
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Medical providers have highest social value of these supplies, not clear that they highest willingness/ability to pay
|
||||
 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The optimal policy depends on the supply elasticity. If supply cannot react, then high prices only generate additional rents.
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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During a pandemic is a different answer than in normal times.
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Uncertain. A market does not rule out government purchase and reallocation to critical users.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Wearing a mask has external effects. Denying masks to bus drivers on price grounds affects not just the driver but the passengers.
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are externalities.
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Depends on the alternative distribution system
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I assume we mean in a crisis where there is a shortage and supply is inelastic. Letting prices clear the market would cause huge anger.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I would say "was" detrimental, particularly when Feds competed against states. There was no price, just chaotic & wasteful frenzy.
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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relative to what alternative? having watched many governments struggle to do basic functions does not inspire confidence
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Public health externalities need to be internalized.
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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With supply fixed in short run, markets don't work well (poor states can't get equipment). Need federal coordination for supply and distrib
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||||
 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Coupling pre-crisis prices with an effective centralized allocation scheme would be more effecient and better for morale.
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||||
 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Use of masks benefits others and policies should combine penalties for non-use and subsidies for purchase.
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||||
 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This neglects very important externalities: a mask is more valuable in the hands of a first-responder than in the hands of a rich recluse.
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This crisis has reinforced the importance of prices for rationing demand and increasing supply
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Public good not the same as WTP.
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||||
 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There is a strong positive externality, indeed it is almost all externality. But need to ensure supply and quality too.
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||||
Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
It may be better to allocate them to the needy via subsidies and government programs than price caps, which may distort signals to producers
|
||||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
It depends on the characteristics of the good.
|
||||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not enough to ban pricing! Need a mechanism to substitute based on view that social value does not equal private value at this point in time
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Enforcement of price caps is always a challenge so may be the government should directly sell them
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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the law can't be general, since regulation has to depend on supply elasticity.
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Market pricing (including gouging) in a crisis might be neoclassically "efficient" but rationing could help many poor and vulnerable people.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Would raise supply, but not necessarily allocation if people are making purchase decisions on the basis of highly incomplete information.
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Again, externalities
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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see previous
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The alternative seems a lot worse.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I interpret "crisis" to be an unanticipated event, one with no Arrow-Debreu price. Markets are not complete. Intervention can then be good.
|
||||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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suppose that SOME toilet paper had been sold at 25 times the normal price early in the crisis...
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||||
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Depends on what other policies are pursued.
-see background information here |
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sometimes beneficial to protect consumers from sudden price increases, but we need production and innovation which high prices encourage.
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Such laws would discourage supply. Better for government to buy at market price and distribute at lower prices. See URL for question 1
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Too vague to be useful.
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Just preventing high prices is not the solution, need centralized government to organize supply and distribution (just like war equipment)
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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To raise social welfare, such laws must be complemented by a effective, coordinated allocation scheme.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It depends on supply elasticity.
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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For most goods, like snowshovels, externalities are not important. Non-price allocation methods are not generally ethically superior.
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Such laws encourage hoarding and black markets
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James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not clear we need laws. The public usually enforces the laws of fairness without legal action.
-see background information here |
||||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This depends on the implementation. A bad law could be a crude and ineffective tool.
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||||
Question C Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Provided that corruption and inefficiency in choosing suppliers can be kept under control.
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Government should procure. Not clear government/public should transfer all surplus to private sector
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Depends on the structure of the market. If there is, say, a monopoly of supply, time for the Defense Production Act to determine the price.
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
see previous
|
||||
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This could work but it may be better for the government to use its bargaining/coercive powers to force price close to marginal cost.
|
||||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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||||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This sounds a lot like the Fifth Amendment on eminent domain. I approve.
|
||||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
watching hospitals on the south side of chicago run out of supplies was awful. we can do better than that.
|
||||
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Yes, government may be natural purchaser in some cases, e.g. on behalf of hospitals serving low-income populations.
|
||||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This assumes that government can determine need
|
||||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Yes and Fed govt also needs to help increase supply by paying suppliers with fair prices based on production costs + reasonable bonus
|
||||
|
Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Effective government policy of this type would yield efficient economic outcomes and better health outcomes.
|
||||
|
José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
"what would have been the market price" must consider the pandemic and supply elasticities; could be much higher than pre-pandemic prices.
|
||||
|
Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This might solve the externality problem, depending on how "need" is defined, but it would blunt incentives to produce.
|
||||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
You can't trust this government to do anything.
|
||||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Again, the details matter. Different approaches best for masks, vaccinations, tests, drugs for treatment.
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