Question A:
It would serve the US economy well to make it unlawful for companies with revenues over $1 billion to offer goods or services for sale at an “unconscionably excessive price” during an exceptional market shock.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
16%
2%
21%
44%
12%
5%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
32%
52%
13%
3%
0%
Question B:
It would serve the US economy well if companies making quarterly SEC filings were obliged to include a tabulation of all price changes of goods or services sold, together with the associated cost changes.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
16%
2%
28%
35%
9%
9%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
47%
37%
10%
5%
0%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In principle yes, but implementing this could be difficult, and setting the right level is hard (so that supply responses are not dulled).
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This just seems unenforceable at every level. What is unconscionable? Why only companies above $1 bil?
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Confident that I don't know, nor what "unconscionable" means. Sympathetic to aims though.
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aware of the First Welfare Theorem, but morally there should be a limit to markups after a tragedy. The definition should be very specific.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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An existential threat to lives & livelihoods (circumstances akin to war): yes. A "exceptional market shock" though? What exactly qualifies?
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Why the 1 billion cutoff? How would we decide what "excessive" or "exceptional" is? Implementation seems impossible.
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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how are we back on this again?
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Totally impractical!
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The terms "unconsciously excessive price" and "exceptional market shock" are not well-defined and so enforcement would be a nightmare
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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If this language is used, it seems far too vague. Price caps would be better then, but I don't think we are there yet.
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Prices reequilibriate mkts by generating supply & demand responses.Suppressing prices is counterprdctive except in ST events like hurricanes
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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What is the definition of "unconscionable"? Laws must be far clearer and more precise than vague phrases that express moral sentiments.
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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At a time of shortage, high prices can serve to stimulate an increase in supply.
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Price gouging should be prohibitive, but "unconscionably excessive" is vague and good stock markets is not an obvious trigger.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The first step is to define an "unconscionably excessive price". One that is done, economists can evaluate the effects of this bill.
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hard to define.
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Obvious answer is "strong disagree" as in Econ 101. But there are rare circumstances where markets are noxious and alt allocation is best.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This would be useful info for investors and regulators. Not clear whether just information provision is sufficient, but it's a first step.
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This sounds like a bureaucratic nightmare. We need healthy competition policy, not a government that scrutinizes every price change!
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Disclosure is helpful, but the benefit here seems to be exceeded by the cost, including the cost of securities litigation.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I'd question the information content and utility of such disclosures. Think cost estimates as used in anti-dumping actions.
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It would introduce an incredible bureaucracy with no tangible benefits. Seems the first step towards price controls.
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paasche or Laspeyres?
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Even more impractical!
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The reporting would be costly for firms and intrusive, and I don't see the obvious benefits
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This idea is more creative than what was proposed in first part, but as a practical tool infeasible (what should it cover?).
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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What would SEC do with this? Putting into a form for SEC would be costly. Making this info public may be good if there was some purpose.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Benefits are unclear, if non-existent, while costs are likely meaningful.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The data on price changes might be helpful, but we have the CPI and PPI already and I would be skeptical about reported cost changes.
-see background information here |
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The regulatory burden seems high and I'm not clear what use of these data is envisioned
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The compliance burden would be high, with no indication of how the information will be used or what benefits it will bring.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Too costly.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I would expect this would be easy for firms to manipulate. Seems wasteful.
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