Question A:
The response to recent bank failures should be to: Expand central banks’ lender of last resort facilities for banks.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
30%
4%
4%
16%
30%
16%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
9%
27%
39%
26%
0%
Question B:
The response to recent bank failures should be to: Substantially increase the limit on bank deposit insurance.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
30%
4%
6%
28%
10%
20%
2%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
13%
42%
14%
29%
2%
Question C:
The response to recent bank failures should be to: Substantially increase bank capital requirements.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
30%
4%
2%
6%
14%
32%
12%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
5%
9%
14%
49%
24%
Question D:
The response to recent bank failures should be to: Use market values of all traded assets to compute banks’ regulatory capital.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
30%
12%
0%
12%
20%
22%
4%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
0%
23%
30%
39%
9%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
![]() Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
In some cases this may help but in others it may not. It's not clear central banks have done a very good job in recent years.
|
||||
![]() Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
I just do not understand the statement. The LOL role is already available for banks. Is the proposal to make it more generous, to extend it to other institutions?
|
||||
![]() Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
But it should not be the only response!
|
||||
![]() Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Luis Garicano |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
LOLR should be really a last resort. We need to ensure that banks have enough capital to avoid these failures. The Basle rules are a good start- pity that the implementation is riddled with holes.
|
||||
![]() Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Sergei Guriev |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
Availability of LOLR facilities is, in practice, already ample. Extensive loans were provided in both the the US and Switzerland. Still, failing banks should be resolved.
|
||||
![]() Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
For moral hazard reasons I find a clear distinction between safe and risky (i.e. liable in the crisis) liabilities more important. A reform of the rules governing deposit insurance can do the trick, I maintain.
|
||||
![]() Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
LOLR should deal with short-term liquidity only.
|
||||
![]() Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
Optimal response to recent bank failures is stronger enforcement of risk limitations. In the US, the culprit was failed/insufficient bank supervision. The primary response should be to tighten the conduct of bank supervision
|
||||
![]() Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
I am not sure on this one.
|
||||
![]() John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Any expansion should come with quid pro quo in terms of capital and/or propositioned haircut collateral
|
||||
![]() Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
![]() Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
It doesn't seem likely that increasing deposit insurance is helpful. Firms and individuals can buy government securities or mutual funds that buy them if they are concerned about default risk.
|
||||
![]() Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
I don't think the moral hazard issue is partlcularly serious in this context.
|
||||
![]() Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
Together with a stronger monitoring and regulation of banks' risk taking activity
|
||||
![]() Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Luis Garicano |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Sergei Guriev |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
It's not a question of simply increasing the ceiling. What is needed is a politically sustainable definition of what categories of deposit (e,g, those used for working capital of SMEs) are protected. Without that, ex post bailouts are inevitable.
|
||||
![]() Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
Yes, that is exactly our program
-see background information here |
||||
![]() Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Higher deposit insurance not needed for ordinary retail customers. Corporate deposits for payrolls etc can be much higher and should go to money market funds.
|
||||
![]() Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
Once the Fed bailed out SVB, the market expects unlimited deposit insurance. This forces the and of the Fed to deliver in the event of a future crisis. Accordingly, bank depositors should pay for the implicit insurance
|
||||
![]() Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
This makes sense to avoid bank runs (even despite some moral hazard effects).
|
||||
![]() John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Again this would need accompanying increase in capital requirements
|
||||
![]() Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Question C Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
![]() Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
It is not clear we measure bank capital in a good way. Perhaps more importantly, we don't have good theories of bank capital that are widely agreed.
|
||||
![]() Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Luis Garicano |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Sergei Guriev |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
And regulatory capital should not neglect capital losses on traded government securities resulting from to general interest rate increases.
|
||||
![]() Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
To prevent a bank-run, we need a reliable deposit insurance. To prevent moral hazard of an increased deposit insurance, we need lots of bail-in able debt, as well as equity. But equity is not the panacea...
|
||||
![]() Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
For recent runs, liquidity & unstable, short-term funding structures were a bigger issue than level of capital. However, bank capital was shielded from losses for certain securities. Undoing these prudential filters amounts to increasing capital requirements, which is why I agree
|
||||
![]() Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Current requirements much too low to provide proper cushion against shocks and to give time for remedial measures if bank is on an unsustainable path.
|
||||
![]() Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
Miller-Modigliani applies in the long run: there is no trade-off between bank equity and GDP in the long run (but steep trade-off exists in short run). Accordingly, the capital requirements should be increased gradually and steadily (over 10-year period) to new high level
|
||||
![]() Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Despite efforts, banks still seem rather under-capitalised.
|
||||
![]() John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
The case was strong independently of the recent failures
|
||||
![]() Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Question D Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
![]() Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
This would be an improvement over current rules probably. However, it doesn't deal with the problem of untraded assets.
|
||||
![]() Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Luis Garicano |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Sergei Guriev |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
Am inclined to restrict this to cover valuation changes related to movements in risk-free yields e.g. on traded government bonds. Including other market movements may generate too much procyclicality.
|
||||
![]() Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
The accounting should depend on the business model, i.e. whether securities are held to maturity or not. What is needed, however, is transparency - so the market can account for expected losses, and banks can respond with change of their equity.
|
||||
![]() Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Q is too broad. Uncertain for all trad assets. Agree prudential filters for AFS securities should be removed, so that fair value losses affect capital in timely fashion. Banks w/ short-term funding should not use historical cost for HTM securities. Ability to hold matters.
-see background information here |
||||
![]() Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not marking to market gives a misleading picture of solvency. See Admati-Hellwig-Portes VoxEU columns on SVB and CS.
|
||||
![]() Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
My agreement is qualified. Taken literally there are clear dangers of pro-cyclicality. But market values are underused and should at least be used in parallel to traditional methods, e.g. in stress tests.
|
||||
![]() Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
![]() Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
![]() Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
|