US

Policy Responses to Recent Bank Failures

Question A:

Policy Responses to Recent Bank Failures


The response to recent bank failures should be to: Expand central banks’ lender of last resort facilities for banks.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

The response to recent bank failures should be to: Substantially increase the limit on bank deposit insurance.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question C:

The response to recent bank failures should be to: Substantially increase bank capital requirements.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question D:

The response to recent bank failures should be to: Use market values of all traded assets to compute banks’ regulatory capital.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Continuously expanding these facilities without simultaneously improving regulations is counterproductive. Banks need to be regulated better first and then more liquidity provision can be more socially productive (and also legitimate in the eyes of a justifiably concerned public)
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Disagree
2
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Expanding LOLR includes new requirements that banks are operationally ready to use LOLR, for example with collateral positioned at the Discount Window. This would increase the speed of liquidity and reassure the holders of runnable liabilities.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Assuming responsible use of expanded facilities
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Expand last resort facilities BUT make sure bad banks die.
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Solvency problems are not solved by lender of last resort interventions
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Much better regulation and higher capital requirements first. Regulation is currently partly done by large depositors and partly by government agencies. Full deposit insurance to large depositors removes the former channel so we need more guardrails against bank misbehavior first
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Disagree
2
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Disagree
2
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
This is "a" response, and would help somewhat if not done too aggressively. But is it "the" response? No. It would not cure the run problem unless most deposits are covered, but then the moral hazard causes too much distortion.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
In practice the limit never binds in a serious crisis, but it could still have deterrence effect..
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
We should not take out too much risk for large depositors.
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
There needs to be some sort of carveout for business accounts so that firms can make their payroll payments etc. The challenge is to stop people from being able to put everything into those accounts when stress arises.
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History

Question C Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Better supervisory regulation and higher capital requirements for banks are complementary and essential tools.
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Yes, this would work. Capital requirements should increase. In case it is blocked politically, and perhaps in any case, other avenues (like expanded LOLR) should also be pursued.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Though bank capital requirements don’t help in crisis, it limits lending that can reduce likelihood of one
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Depositors' money can move quickly in response to information and/or misinformation. More capital is needed to defend bank against bad news and/or bad rumors.
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
If capital had been computed correctly the current requirements would have been okay. Notice that the US GSIBs all seem fine. Credit Suisse was walking dead for some time. Supervision was the bigger problem in both the US and Switzerland.
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Higher capital could be one tool, but there are other complementary prudential measures that could strengthen banks.
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
We should also consider increasing liability of banks top-management and controlling shareholder.
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History

Question D Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Generally yes, but this could be a problem during crisis periods when there are temporary "fire sales".
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Uncertain
10
Bio/Vote History
The benefits of more accurate accounting are obvious. This would work if capital requirements are high. But if capital buffers are low, the volatility of market values could lead to sudden deleveraging.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Market values seem to have had some predictive value, but I am uncomfortsble using them explicitly in policy
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Some assets are too risky for the role of regulatory capital.
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Certainly for assets that trade regularly. As we learned in 2008/9, there is lots of highly rated debt securities that rarely trade. So this will not be a panacea.
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Potentially a problem in terms of reinforcing fire-sale dynamics.
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History