Italy’s Banks

Question A:

Setting the EU rules aside, and assuming it would take 2.5% of Italy’s GDP to recapitalize its banks, the Italian government would improve financial stability in Europe if it injected this amount of public funds into its banks.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

If Italy were to inject public funds into its banks without imposing losses on at least some claimants, an important cost would be the effect on future incentives (economic or political) in Europe.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Aghion
Philippe Aghion
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Italy's banks are significantly undercapitalized, particularly if you consider market rather than accounting capital.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
It would probably improve financial stability. A different matter is whether that should be the only principle guiding tax policy.
Baldwin
Richard Baldwin
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
if italy's debt is sustainable at 130%, it is surely sustainable at 132.5% if the financial system is functioning better.
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
I mildly agree with the statement but have insufficient knowledge of the current system to make a strong statement.
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Some public recapitalization is actually needed, although maybe as much as 2.5% of GDP, and not outside EU rules.
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Uncertain
9
Bio/Vote History
The effect of injecting public funds into the Italian banking system depends a lot on how this is done and on the investors' reactions.
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
The counterpart should be an equity stake in the banks that the Italian State could re-sell in the future hopefully with an overall profit
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
In the short run yes. However in the long run the financial system would be weaker.
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
In the short run stability would be higher, in the long run not if the measure is not associated with reducing future moral hazard
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
The lack of access to finance is hindering Italy's and Europe's growth. A 2.5% is not an excessive price to pay to increase future growth.
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
A bailout is probably good in short term for Financial Stability. But undermines new Euro BRRD framework and opens door to populists.
-see background information here
-see background information here
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
zombie banks would eventually drive Italy out of the euro
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
government debt is substantial, but increasing it by a few percentage points is less risk strategy than leaving banks under capitalized
Hellwig
Martin Hellwig
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Markets can cope with bail in on this scale. They are already discounting it.
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Uncertain
10
Bio/Vote History
Inject all capital into strong banks, not weak ones, thus restructuring and scaling down the entire sector. Good plan, but will not happen.
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
I don't have enough info to say that it would help financial institutions elsewhere; depends on cross-holdings. In long run it's likely bad.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Helps in short-run but not clear in long-run w/o other reforms, as issue is also profitability & bank density; can increase sovereign risks
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Sooner or later, bullets have to be bitten, zombie banks have to be bailed out. Sooner is better. Exactly how is much harder to answer.
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
This is likely to unsettle investor confidence in Italian public debt & reactivate the bank-sovereign doom loop, with knock-on EU effects.
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Italy has been kicking this can down the road far too long. But it’s hard to set EU rules aside, especially the new bank resolution rules.
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
This would be dealing with the symptoms of the banking crisis in Europe and not the cause
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Weak banks are a major impediment to investment and growth and endanger financial stability. Public funds necessary though not sufficient.
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Setting EU rules aside to facilitate a bailout is likely to worsen long-term financial stability in Europe.
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
NPLs are an important factor behind lack of growth, in turn an important factor behind financial instability.Issue is effect on gvt debt.
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Uncertain
9
Bio/Vote History
Banks have far too little capital so more is good. But another bail out would go backwards on incentives. A total mess, not only Italy.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
I think this could easily backfire. Bailouts done right can be a jolly goood thing but i have at least some reservations about the prospects
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
This may improve financial stability in the short-run but probably sets a bad fiscal precedent for other European governments in the future.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
A number of Italian banks need to be recapitalized. If it cannot be done otherwise, the government must step in.
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Aghion
Philippe Aghion
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Shareholders and non-retail bondholders need to be penalised if a bank fails to provide the right incentives going forward.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
It seems pretty clear that bailouts generate a moral hazard problem. They also have a significant impact on government budgets.
Baldwin
Richard Baldwin
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
this is the old moral hazard argument. i believe it is relevant, but of marginal importance empirically.
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Agree with the statement but again not enough current knowledge of the to be very confident of this specific case.
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
In practice it is not possible to move directly from a bail out to a bail in regime, but at least the direction should be made clear.
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
The rules leave the possibility of injecting public funds without private losses, but I agree that this may have important signaling effects
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
But the cost could be containd if this is clearly viewed as a transition to a new regime where this will no longer be possible.
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
In the absence of significant costs to some claim holders, it will be in the interest of banks to take more risks in the future.
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
At the very least it would introduce confusion among investors as the BRRD framework requires 8% bail in.
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
it has happened elsewhere in Europe and there is no dign of a serious deterioration of incentives
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
9
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Imposing losses can be severely destabilising
Hellwig
Martin Hellwig
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Got to get away from bailing out bank creditors with public funds. If not now, when? It's not just EU rules, cf FSB resolution principles
-see background information here
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Europe's new regulatory architecture aims for market discipline through bail-inability of equity and junior debt. US pursues different model
-see background information here
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
The expectations of future bailouts will likely be affected and induce excessive risk-taking.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Bending BRRD would create bad political incentives & undermine EU rules but excluding missold retail would not have same moral hazard effect
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Possibility of moral hazard in medium term versus high probability of financial instability in short term. A tough choice but a clear one.
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Such massive bailout would strengthen banks' moral hazard & leave the EU overbanking problem unsolved, confirming that no exit is possible.
-see background information here
-see background information here
-see background information here
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Breaking the new EU bank resolution rules within the first year would undermine the credibility of the banking union.
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
It would be shifting the burden to tax payers. Claimants might think something similar in future
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Problem in Italy is that bailing would hurt not wealthy retail bond holders, victims of misselling must be compensated.
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
not if recap but also provide incentives/rules aiming at consolidation/governance reform
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Equity holders and junior bond holders should take some losses. Moral hazard can also be dealt with by taking action against management.
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
A 100% bail-out after 8 years of "reform" would take us back to square one on TBTF.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
There is already a lot of concern in Germany about EMU rules being broken. This could be the final straw
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
This would undermine the EU's BRRD approach though it always seemed likely loss imposition was more a policy intended for small countries.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
We have adopted bail-in rules. Ditching them aside would indeed send a terrible signal. But the rules need to be better thought through.
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History