One of the leading reasons for rising U.S. income inequality over the past three decades is that technological change has affected workers with some skill sets differently than others.
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© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
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Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But, importantly, it is not the only factor. The other three are: slower growth in the supply of skills; institutional changes; and trade.
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 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There is a lot of evidence that technical change has favored more skilled workers over the past 3 decades
-see background information here |
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It's not the only factor. Two others: slowing supply of skilled workers, and (probably) distorted pay-setting at the very top.
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are certainly many other factors, such as the tax code, etc.
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 Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Increasing demand for skill is an underlying factor driving increased inequality though institutional changes are also important.
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I think there is excellent evidence on this, though it is also clear that much else is going on. Nor does the tech story imply benignity.
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This partial explanation does not lessen the policy importance of addressing the downside effects, including loss of social cohesion.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Claudia Goldin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But that is only the demand side. The slowdown in the supply of these skill sets is just as important (or more). You need the SS side too.
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The data are pretty obvious that this is a key factor. Not the only one, but a very significant one.
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Seems self-evident but technological change cannot be measured directly; is this a falsifiable hypothesis? what would Karl Popper say?
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Managers and financial salesmen account for most of the earnings growth at the top end. Not clear that tech change is responsible.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It's likely that technological progress has favored high aptitude people. The evidence is only indirect,however: it's a residual explanation
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hard to quantify the exact contribution, but it is undoubtedly big. Also tricky in that it partially interacts with education and trade.
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Edward Lazear |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The distribution has spread out at all relevant deciles. The question that remains is why the skill gap is not closing.
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Although this is a common view, the causal factors are too complex to untangle unambiguously.
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Cecilia Rouse |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Although there is some evidence to the contrary, the nature of occupational change and returns to schooling suggest it's important.
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Big debate on institutions vs. technology in labor economics. Technology is too narrow an explanation as it interacts with institutions.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Investment-specific technical change together with capital-skill complementarity explains much of the increase in the skill premium.
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Compared to what? More than 1% have good tech skills. Education disparities and tax policies surely more important.
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is hard to quantify, but the limited evidence is supportive.
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 Luigi Zingales |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The statement is likely to be true but it does not address why the technology moved that way.
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