Question A:
The SEC’s proposed new rule for stock orders from individual investors is likely to be effective in giving those investors better prices on their trades on average.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
The new rule would improve the overall operation of the stock market.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
The quality of execution in the current system varies across brokers because wholesalers offer different discounts to different brokers. The current system is insufficiently transparent but the SEC rule may not improve average quality even if it reduces the dispersion of quality.
-see background information here |
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John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
We can't all have better prices. Who loses? Execution is a tiny issue relative to long term rates of return. Actual knowledge of how SEC rules change equilibrium trading is very thin.
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Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Bidding for orders may improve prices to small investors, but fewer orders may go to dealers offering payment for order flow. Spreads on markets may increase.
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Very hard to predict what happens, as there are extensive and intensive margins at play. But it's worth trying. If it doesn't work, it can be reversed or modified.
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Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
There is a benefit to having institutional investors participate in the auction for retail investor trades. I expect there would be a benefit for high liquidity stocks but could be worse off for lower liquidity stocks. Not clear how the "average" is calculated.
-see background information here |
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David Hirshleifer |
USC | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
More competition for orders will help individual investor order execution.
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Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
there are competing view on this even among people who have no financial stake in the answer
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Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Potentially, but it's not clear it is a major concern to begin with in equities (as opposed to options), see links
-see background information here -see background information here |
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Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
The direct effect of the rule should be beneficial to retail investors. However, the obvious question relates to indirect effects. I have not seen sufficient research to make conclusions regarding indirect effects - and the magnitude of such effects.
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Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not clear they will get better prices when they really need them, like when they demand immediacy, since it may take longer to execute under the new rule.
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Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
The proposed changes seem likely to enhance competition for retail orders.
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Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
Payment for order flow of individual investors makes the payer effectively a monopolist who only has to provide a lower bid-ask spread than the market spread which reflects more informed traders. Competition for clearing individual trades should leave retail investors better off.
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Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
Unclear that moving to trade-by-trade competition for some types of order flow improves market outcomes compared to the current lower frequency competition.
-see background information here |
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Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
SEC estimates suggest a very small improvement.
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Paola Sapienza |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Amir Sufi |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
New rules will improve price transparency and the new protections on paying for order flow will also protect small investors. The latency rule in auctions is good as well and backed up by research.
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Ingrid M. Werner |
OSU Fisher School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
I think the rule is unlikely to have a large effect on the average cost of trading for individual investors. It may slightly improve transparency.
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John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
One thing we know as "experts" is how much other "experts" really don't know. Just how SEC rules improve or diminish market function is mostly made up. Many cases we do know SEC rules make things worse.
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Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
How big is the problem that the SEC is trying to solve with its 399 page proposed rule book? While I like the idea of involving institutional investors in the auction, the market works well now. I would prefer some experiments before making such a big change (ending PFOF).
-see background information here |
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David Hirshleifer |
USC | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not clear overall market efficiency will be so impacted.
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Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
See previous answer.
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Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
There will be winners and losers from this rule, but it is very hard to make predictions regarding overall effects. Also, by changing so many things at once, the SEC loses transparency regarding the efficacy of each individual change.
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Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not all clear and depends what is meant by operation -- on average? during liquidity events? crashes? time of execution? All unclear IMHO.
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Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
This regulatory change may increase or decrease the segregation of the trades of individual and institutional investors, and it is theoretically ambiguous which is better for investor welfare.
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Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
Markets are very complicated and segmentation of order flow often has equilibrium effects.
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Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
Likely to have a positive but very small effect.
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Paola Sapienza |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
I do not think the rule will affect the overall stock market as much to create tangible more efficiency.
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Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Amir Sufi |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ingrid M. Werner |
OSU Fisher School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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