Giving the White House more direct influence over the decisions of the financial regulatory agencies would substantially improve financial stability.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
13%
0%
46%
26%
15%
0%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
57%
28%
15%
0%
0%
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
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![]() John Campbell |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
In principle, central coordination of the federal regulatory agencies could be helpful - but in practice, White House influence on regulators will subordinate financial stability to other, political objectives.
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![]() John Cochrane |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Financial regulation is. Mess, and subject to much industry capture. See SVB for latest indication of competence. An energetic wh could reform. Or could channel even more rent seeking behavior.
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![]() Francesca Cornelli |
Northwestern Kellogg | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Douglas Diamond |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Wenxin Du |
HBS | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
The White House could in principle provide effective coordination and oversight, but in practice would probably bring in an excessively political short term perspective. Depends on who is in the White House.
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![]() Janice Eberly |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
Some form of independence is meant to strike a balance, maintaining regulatory accountability but limiting potential politicization. Putting an agency under direct Executive branch control removes that buffer and raises the risk of instability.
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![]() Eugene Fama |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Xavier Gabaix |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Itay Goldstein |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() John Graham |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Campbell R. Harvey |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
I chose uncertain because of the word "substantial". In some situations, I believe it is appropriate for the executive branch to provide leadership. E.g., the dysfunctional 'regulation by enforcement' of digital assets space over the past 4 years. That has changed with new admin.
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![]() Harrison Hong |
Columbia | Bio/Vote History | ||
Compromised independence
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![]() Wei Jiang |
Emory Goizueta | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Look at all the gesticulating to the crypto industry as an example of what to expect.
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![]() Ralph Koijen |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
It depends on the nature of the intervention. For insurance, where the regulatory environment is fragmented due to the state-level regulation, federal oversight can help. Such initiatives can also help to harmonize and coordinate regulation of banks and insurers.
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![]() Camelia Kuhnen |
UNC Kenan-Flagler | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Andrew Lo |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
Separation of powers.
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![]() Michelle Lowry |
Drexel LeBow | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Sydney Ludvigson |
NYU | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Matteo Maggiori |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Gregor Matvos |
Northwestern Kellogg | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Tobias Moskowitz |
Yale School of Management | Bio/Vote History | ||
I’m not stability is the primary concern, but independence of financial regulation has many benefits. Stability could be one of them, though would also be a function of who is in the White House. If political aims are fighting market movements, that can cause instability.
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![]() Stefan Nagel |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Jonathan Parker |
MIT Sloan | Bio/Vote History | ||
Clear, stable, rule-based, and centralized financial regulation can provide the best support for competitive and efficient markets, but credit and financial policies are often used for political purpose — and are in the U.S. — and some independence (see Fed, SEC, etc.) is best.
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![]() Christine Parlour |
Berkeley Haas | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Thomas Philippon |
NYU Stern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Manju Puri |
Duke Fuqua | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Michael R. Roberts |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Paola Sapienza |
Hoover Institution Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Amit Seru |
Stanford GSB | Bio/Vote History | ||
Regulatory overlap creates confusion, with multiple agencies interpreting and enforcing the same rules differently (see URL). Reducing duplication could improve enforcement and reduce policy uncertainty. However, centralizing oversight under the White House is not the solution.
-see background information here |
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![]() Robert Stambaugh |
UPenn Wharton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Laura Starks |
UT Austin McCombs | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Jeremy Stein |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Johannes Stroebel |
NYU Stern | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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![]() Sheridan Titman |
UT Austin McCombs | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
Columbia Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Independent review by an expert commission provides the best chance for impartial, technical analysis, and ultimately for financial stability
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![]() Toni Whited |
UMich Ross School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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