There are no consequential distortions created by the tax preference that favors obtaining health insurance through employers.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
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Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
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Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
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![]() Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Linking health insurance to (current) employment distorts both labor market choices and health care decisions.
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![]() Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
We need consumers of healthcare to be *less* insulated from the price system, not more. The tax credit provides insulation and subsidy!
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![]() Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Creates distortion in both health and labor markets.
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![]() Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
There are giant distortions.
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![]() Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
Subsidizing health insurance through the tax system causes people to be "over-insured," and causes the system to cater to the over-insured.
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![]() David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
Note that this is not a welfare statement. Many of the distortions are good (eg pooling benefits). And welfare requires a counterfactual.
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![]() Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
This seems an indirect approach.
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![]() Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
just to name one distortion, dental insurance is often bought when few employees would pay that much with their own money.
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![]() Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Lowers the price of health insurance encouraging excessive health care spending. Contributes to rising h.c.costs. Benefits higher incomes.
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![]() Claudia Goldin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
There are many distortions of great consequence created by the policy.
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![]() Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Pretty clear directionally but question as to how impactful is the distortion in magnitude.
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![]() Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
likely increases labor supply and causes "too much" health care consumption for insured. i THINK the "job lock" literature didn't find much
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Financing health care through employers is crazy. It's essential to move to a system where people pay for health, with some gov help.
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![]() Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
All selective subsidies create distortions.
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![]() Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Tax prefs create job lock, prevent formation of a more competitive health insurance mkt, & discourage insurance coverage among young workers
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![]() Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
One significant possible distortion is a reduction in labor mobility.
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![]() Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Lock in is inefficient and there is no good reason to use the tax code to subsidize health insurance purchases.
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![]() Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
1. Subsidizes health spending. 2. Increases other marginal tax rates. 3. Reduces job mobility.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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![]() Edward Lazear |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
The is much evidence on this point and alternative proposals that could remove distortions and provide better health care incentives.
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![]() Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Many well documented distortions, including differential treatment of people, and not available when people most need it.
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![]() Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Cecilia Rouse |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
It likely distorts both health care decisions and the composition of total compensation.
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![]() Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Job lock distortion but not certain that tax preference is key factor making employers provide health care
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![]() José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
This is pretty basic, as is the fact that the distortions (econ speak for costs to society) are huge.
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![]() Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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![]() Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Yes the tax causes distortions but without Obamacare or some equivalent, we need health insurance provided by employers.
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![]() Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
It is apparent that linking insurance to employment is distortionary. Measuring the magnitude of these distortions is a challenge.
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![]() Luigi Zingales |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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