Question A:

Assuming it exits its third bailout program this summer without an immediate restructuring or other debt relief, Greece is unlikely to default on its sovereign debt in the coming decade.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

Greece would be better off if it had decided to exit the euro between 2011 and 2015.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question C:

If Greece had defaulted on (or restructured) its private debt in 2010, while also staying within the euro, that combination would have been better for Greece than either exiting the euro or proceeding as it has actually done.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Aghion
Philippe Aghion
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
I would say there is a great deal of uncertainty about this with much depending on how things develop in the Eurozone in the coming years.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Hard to imagine an outright default could happen. There will be other opportunities to restructure.
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
If they have to pay market rates for new lending, it is very difficult to see how they will be able to repay.
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
It would probably be later, given the maturity of the debt.
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Official lenders can string this out for at least another decade; but Greece may not be willing to deliver the primary surpluses entailed.
-see background information here
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Greece is now back on track, has accepted many hardships in order to comply with European requests - why should it change its stance?
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Very hard to predict. Much depends on continued structural reforms & if there is a major shock to world economy. Not much room for error.
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
In a low-growth, scenario, debt relief will be needed to avoid a default, and default without debt relief could take place within 10 years.
-see background information here
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Repayment terms are easy if interest rates do not hike. The economy will grow and fiscal budget is in surplus
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Net financing needs are very low for the next decade.
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Uncertain
10
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Net financing needed by Greece is small over that horizon.
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
10Y bond yield of 4.2% is well above bunds but does not suggest that default is more likely than not
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Gross financing needs only increase later, in the short run they ar low due to highly concessional conditions on European loans.
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Uncertain. The debt is unsustainable (see the recent CEPR report) but there will likely be debt relief thus avoiding an outright default.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Most serious studies find that the Greek debt is unlikely to be sustainable.
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
I interpret "default" it as an outright unilateral decision. A different point is whether there there will be haircuts and renegotiations.

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Aghion
Philippe Aghion
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
It has suffered a punishing depression and has only recently started growing. It would have grown much faster outside the Eurozone.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Uncertain
9
Bio/Vote History
Transitional costs could have been large.
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
They would have needed help from others, but they would have been able to improve competitiveness much faster, and get growth going earlier
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Posted an external deficit along the crisis, thanks to emergency assistance and Target inflows. Alone, it would have lost more purch power.
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
under the assumption of a prepared, coordinated exit
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Weak short or medium-term export supply elasticity. Exit unlikely to improve financial, macroeconomic or political stability.
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Exiting a currency union is tough. Lots of international exposures will be in default, because of the extreme devaluation.
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Disagree
2
Bio/Vote History
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Exit restores competitiveness, but would have led to default on euro liab thereafter would have been little political will to help Greece.
-see background information here
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
If it had done so, today Greece would have runaway inflation and difficulty in accessing international capital markets.
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
The transition cost would have been very high and governments would have resorted to inflation-finance, devaluations and no reforms
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Financial system would have collapsed completely.
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
There would have been a major crisis with social distress and no institutional reforms.
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Major exit costs v some benefits of devaluation. Euro-denominated debt would still need servicing.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Better to have larger sovereign default in 2011 restoring sustainability and avoiding the excessively tight fiscal policy of 2012 onwards.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
You don't exit the euro for a few years and then come back. If you exit, you're out, maybe better off in the medium run.
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History

Question C Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Aghion
Philippe Aghion
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
It would have removed the debt overhang and could have grown much faster as a result.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
I argued that at the time.
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Staying in the euro under reduced debt is better if the necessary reforms are also implemented
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
The default-in-2010 option would have been close to Banking Union rules: Bail-in creditors - which at the time were mostly foreign banks
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Disagree
2
Bio/Vote History
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Default w/ liquidity for GR/EU banking system & money for structural reform would have been better than giving money to creditors. See oped.
-see background information here
-see background information here
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
This would have avoided excess fiscal contraction, and kept price & financial stability.
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Cypriot deposit haircut had similar effects. In Cyprus unsuspecting depositors lost their assets in Greece's lenders would have lost them
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Unfortunately, European officials (including ECB) blocked this path.
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Greece was insolvent and an orderly default inside euro coupled with reforms would have been best.
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Not very clear what doing the same thing 2 years earlier would have bought them...
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Euro membership provided stability and low interest rates. The damage was done by "debt denial " and excessively tight fiscal policy.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Barry Eichengreen and I tell the story, see the URL.
-see background information here
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
In 2011, private-sector holders of Greek debt did take a 53% write-down on the value of their holdings.