Question A:
Firms’ incentives to reduce costs by sourcing inputs and products abroad have caused many American industries to become more vulnerable to supply chain disruptions.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
7%
0%
0%
5%
12%
74%
2%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
0%
7%
6%
83%
3%
Question B:
Private firms have inadequate incentives to make investments to reduce the risk that disruptions in the supply of imports will cause shortages and raise domestic prices.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
7%
0%
5%
19%
26%
42%
2%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
6%
21%
22%
47%
4%
Question C:
Global supply chain disruptions are the main driver of elevated US inflation over the past year.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
7%
0%
5%
33%
42%
14%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
7%
39%
39%
15%
0%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Complex supply chains tend to create "risk externalities" domestically and globally, which are often uninternalized.
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There are many types of supply chain disruptions--here you have the international kind in mind I assume.
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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One caveat: supply chain disruptions can also occur within a country.
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Domestic supply chains can also be complex and delicate.
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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True, but global pandemics didn't happen often, so hard to see how better incentives would have helped.
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Cost cutting through lower inventories of parts makes production less resilient. That could happen with domestic supply and bottlenecks too.
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not just sourcing abroad, but also just-in-time inventory management, failure to build in redundancy etc.
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Depends on the shock. When the shock facing industries is domestic, international diversification via GSCs reduces vulnerability.
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But it can happen with sourcing at home too.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But, those incentives have changed. Expect to see more diversified sourcing.
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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What's the counterfactual about how the domestic alternative is structured? is it geographically diversified? wildfire, hurricane risk, etc
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Certainly to global Covid disruptions. But domestic supply chains also can have vulnerabilities so a comparison is tricky.
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Outsourcing makes supply disruption possible---but the outsourcing need not be foreign to create vulnerability.
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Firms trade off supply-chain cost and reliability. Sourcing abroad moves them along the frontier toward lower-cost/less-reliability.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This does not imply that international sourcing is inefficient
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Other cost-reducing measures, such as JIT inventory management, also contribute.
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This also, theoretically, follows from the "risk externalities". Security investments in a network benefit other firms and consumers
-see background information here |
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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No reason that private firms would fully internalize this public goods/national security concern.
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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After all being the only one who can supply in a crisis has its attractions.
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In might make sense to introduce stress tests for global value chains
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Inadequate from what perspective? They won't hold excess capacity for national rather than private interests certainly.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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see above.
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I’m no expert on this, but I don’t see the market failure. That’s a cost benefit trade-off.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Though I'd put it somewhat differently. Financial-market pressures, gov policy etc. create incentives to under-insure.
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Again, broad international diversification is the best way to reduce this risk, and firms have invested heavily in this.
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It is not easy for private agents to reduce the risk of a supply disruption caused by an aggregate shock, such as a pandemic
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The major problem was that everyone was overconfident, and no one thinks about low probability events.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Expect to see companies make investments and adjustments that reduce the likelihood of this going forward.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Must depend on the size of the firm, surely walmart worries about this.
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There is an externality---a firm that protects itself against disruption also protects the firms it supplies; see Elliott and Golub (2020)
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Yes, externalities, but most of impacts are on (short-sighted) firms.
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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If a firm's supply is disrupted, that generates disruptions all further down the supply chain that the firm doesn't necessarily internalize.
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Firms do not internalize the externalities their disruptions impose on others. It is less clear how significant these externalities are.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There may be an externality here, but I've seen no evidence that it's important.
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There is an externality; free-riding seems likely.
-see background information here |
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Question C Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Supply chain disruptions are a contributing factor, but probably not the "main" factor.
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Main? Panemic related shifts in demand from services to consumer goods and lower labor supply are also important.
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It's one of the drivers. Two others: demand surge due to pandemic aid transfer programs + consumption shift from services to goods
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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it is one driver among several others, not "the" driver.
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hard to definitively disentangle the impact of supply and demand shocks.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not sure what "main" means. I think they were main at the beginning.
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Supply and demand are both factors. Who is to say which is greater
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Perhaps "a main" rather than "the main." Demand pressure and changes in the composition of demand also important.
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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High demand, DOMESTIC supply chain disruptions, and labor shortages are more important.
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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They are one driver but there are others: fiscal stimulus and the great resignation
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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A driver but not the main driver.
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Inflation differentials tell us supply problems are important. M growth is important but "long and variable lags" make its impact unclear.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Supply plays a role. But, so does huge increase in demand from government stimulus as well as increased energy regulation.
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Look at rent and wages, this has mattered but so has fiscal support and monetary policy
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Import prices have only contributed about 1.4 percentage points of inflation per year since April 2020.
-see background information here |
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I would have said "a" main driver"- surely government spending also has contributed to current demand - supply imbalances.
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Disruption is certainly one inflation driver, but there are others (e.g., the great resignation), and I don't know which is most important.
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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A driver, but many components are largely independent (energy, used cars, food).
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Clearly important but unclear if they are literally > or < 50% responsible. If you forced me, I would guess somewhat > 50%.
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Supply-chain disruptions increase cost, but there are other important forces behind inflation.
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||||
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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However, fiscal policy and shifts in labor supply probably also important contributors.
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Supply chain disruptions should move relative prices, not the price level
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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An important contributing factor, not "main driver"; also labor mkt tightness and high domestic demand, both pandemic-induced.
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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