European Deposit Insurance

Question A:

A common European deposit insurance scheme, once fully implemented, would increase the stability of European economies in the event of another financial crisis.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

A common European deposit insurance scheme, once fully implemented, would increase the likelihood of another financial crisis in Europe.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Theoretically it can go both ways as deposit insurance can increase risk taking. Empirically there is some evidence crises can increase.
-see background information here
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Strongly Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Though not the most valuable form of cross-border risk-sharing
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
“Fully implemented” implies implementation in a way that minimizes moral hazard, e.g. through a European reinsurance scheme.
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
A common system appears constraining, given differences in financial systems across countries.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
In principle effect of DI in crisis is clear, but for EU DI much depends on implementation and harmonization. EU has mixed record on that.
-see background information here
-see background information here
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Actually, creating a euro-wide deposit insurance system is a necessary element to complete the Banking Union and stabilise Europe's banks.
-see background information here
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Strongly Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
A common scheme prevents a race to the bottom in the event of a crisis, and should include a fair contributn system across countries exante
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
But other measures matter more -- e.g. depositor preference for insured deposits. Then, if(??) resolution works, deposits are safe anyway.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
A common deposit insurance scheme will somewhat weaken the bank runs that occur in euro area countries with fiscal or banking problems.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Helps break the doom loop
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Complicated issue because of the effect of deposit insurance on risk taking.
-see background information here
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Besley
Timothy J. Besley
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Empirical evidence on emerging countries seems to indicate this. Could we extrapolate to Europe? Not obvious
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Not with adequate supervision and macroprudential policies
Garicano
Luis Garicano
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Removing bank default risk from small depositors would not imply a dangerous subsidy of risk-taking by supervised banks
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Kleven
Henrik Kleven
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
No, it would not iprovided it is implemented cleverly, e.g. relying on a reinsurance scheme.
Krusell
Per Krusell
Stockholm University
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Moral hazard is relevant but so is a risk of runs. I’m not an expert.
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Clear tradeoff w/ ex ante moral hazard. Evidence supports this & some suggests ex ante effect dominates but much depends on supervision.
-see background information here
-see background information here
-see background information here
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Quite the opposite: it is essential for systemic stability of the banking system. Of course, if it is well designed!
-see background information here
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Strongly Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Uncertain
9
Bio/Vote History
Uncertain because could distract from more fundamental issues such as the need for European banks to have much more capital
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
While there is possibly an element of moral hazard with deposit insurance, crisis are generally due to inadequate banking regulation.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Regulation and supervision needs to be strong
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History