Question A:
The president has signed an executive order that pauses enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Permanently ending US enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act will substantially increase global levels of bribery and corruption.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
7%
13%
0%
2%
13%
41%
24%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
0%
3%
14%
44%
39%
Question B:
Permanently ending US enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act will substantially improve US businesses' long-term profits and long-term competitiveness.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
7%
13%
9%
26%
46%
0%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
15%
39%
47%
0%
0%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The U.S. is a norm-setter for the democratic world. The new message is: corruption is how we will all do business.
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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If bribery of foreign officials is legalized, it's natural to predict more use of bribery as a business tool.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is not least the case because other countries may be inclined to follow suit.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is not a question that most economists could answer with expertise. Those who have the expertise should answer. Those who would just be pontificating should refrain.
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The US should encourage honest business practices, not turn a blind eye to corruption.
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Parag Pathak |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It would increase, but nor certain about "substantial"
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I don't know how one way or the other if FCPA was successful at shifting the equilibrium. Maybe it was and this will cause a big change; I just don't know the evidence.
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Existing empirical work is not that strong, but there is evidence that FCPA reduces bribery in third countries by US and (crucially) foreign firms that do business in the USA.
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 Ivan Werning |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The main problem for United States in the next four years is likely to be the collapse of its institutions and its own increasing corruption problem, starting from the very top. This would be one more step to enshrine a corruption culture in the United States.
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Mark Aguiar |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I know of no evidence on this question. But if corruption raises profitability, I'm not sure that these are 'normal economic profits' or simply rents. And if they're rents, ending FCPA encourages rent-seeking. Rents are not by definition harmful, but rent-seeking surely is
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Dirk Bergemann |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Increased relative US competitiveness, yes. Increased long-term profitability depends on whether degrading the rule of law causes efficiency losses to trump relative US competitiveness.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Edward Glaeser |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is unclear for the same reason: Other countries may follow suit, leveling the playing field. At the same time the world will be worse off.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is not a question that most economists could answer with expertise. Those who have the expertise should answer. Those who would just be pontificating should refrain.
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Erik Hurst |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Depends a lot on what other countries do. A race to the bottom where everyone is paying bribes is bad for everyone.
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Presumably, other countries will respond by relaxing their constraints on bribery. So, the overall effect may be to reduce US firms' profits.
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Parag Pathak |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Opening the doors to bribery and corruption will allow some people to enrich themselves, but there is little reason to think these gains will be channeled into profits or increased competitiveness.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It would facilitate US activities in countries with corrupt officials, but honest officials may fear the effect on their reputation of dealing with a US firm.
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Fiona Scott Morton |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Stefanie Stantcheva |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Chad Syverson |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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First, it depends on who is in the market. FCPA is used against non-US firms as well, and can lower equilibrium corruption. Second, do we really want to rely on corruption to gain advantage if indeed it does provide any?
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Ivan Werning |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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