US

Election Economic Policy Ideas

Question A:

Giving the President more direct influence over monetary policy would lead to substantially worse monetary policy decisions.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

Imposing tariffs results in a substantial portion of the tariffs being borne by consumers of the country that enacts the tariffs, through price increases.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question C:

There is little empirical evidence that price gouging is causing high grocery prices.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question D:

Widespread use of price controls creates substantial economic distortions.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Just look at Turkish monetary policy over the last decade as proof. Yet I am no longer convinced that the current independent central banker model is ideal either, because it has created a bias towards propping up financial asset values. We may need to consider alternatives.
Aguiar
Mark Aguiar
Princeton
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Bergemann
Dirk Bergemann
Yale
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Strongly Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Is this a trick question? Only a weird person would advocate this approach. Central banks are independent in order to insulate monetary policy from conflicts of interest related to near-term election results.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Strongly Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Glaeser
Edward Glaeser
Harvard
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Hurst
Erik Hurst
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
NOTE: Respondent meant to answer "Strongly Agree" to this question. Look at history. Nixon appointed Burns to the Fed who then, under pressure from Nixon, set off double digit money creation. Carter appointed Volcker and told him to combat inflation. Volcker raised interest rates in 1980, which surely harmed Carter's reelection campaign.
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
The folly of putting the money supply in political hands has been demonstrated many times in the last hundred years.
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Pathak
Parag Pathak
MIT
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
The key to the Fed's design, and it success, is that it is insulated from political pressures.
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Monetary history of Latin America over the last 100 years provides strong evidence for the high cost of direct influence of the executive branch over monetary policy
-see background information here
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Scott Morton
Fiona Scott Morton
Yale
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Independent central banks are largely responsible for the substantial decline in inflation since 1980 (notwithstanding the last four years)
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Stokey
Nancy Stokey
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Syverson
Chad Syverson
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
There is plenty of empirical evidence and a history of hard lessons learned demonstrating that some independence of the monetary authority from the political process--especially in the short term--is beneficial.
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Likely true, but depends on demand and supply elasticities as well as whether tariffs affect markups. Also depends on whether tariffs can change production structure and impact efficiency in the medium run, à la infant industry arguments. The evidence is still not fully clear.
Aguiar
Mark Aguiar
Princeton
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Bergemann
Dirk Bergemann
Yale
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
The effect of the tariff depends on the condition of the supply. If the products are offered competitively by many countries, then the effect on domestic consumer is likely to be small.
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
At least two channels are at play: (1) lack of perfect substitutability with suitable domestic products, and (2) increased market power for domestic producers.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Glaeser
Edward Glaeser
Harvard
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Usually this is the case. Unless the exporter "eats" the tariffs. Recent experience from the US tariffs on Chinese imports suggests that the tariff incidence was on US importers.
-see background information here
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
But depends on target
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Hurst
Erik Hurst
Chicago Booth
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
When costs go up, firms will raise prices to their customers. Need I say more?
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
The direct effect of the tariff is certainly to reduce consumers' welfare. Still, it is conceivable that a sufficiently small tariff could lead to a Pareto improvement in the tariff-imposing country if there were suitable redistribution.
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Pathak
Parag Pathak
MIT
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Not all tariffs, not all countries, but in the present context, yes.
Scott Morton
Fiona Scott Morton
Yale
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
A substantial portion is also borne by exporting firms (and their workers) through exchange rate adjustment.
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Stokey
Nancy Stokey
University of Chicago
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Syverson
Chad Syverson
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Theory says importer pays an amount that depends on relative supply and demand elasticities. Only in a polar case is importer's share zero. Empirical evidence (one example below) says importer typically bears a lot. Plus there are competitive effects on domestic prices too.
-see background information here
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
obviously this depends on the elasticities, but this is most often exactly what happens.

Question C Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
There is evidence that markups have increased in a number of sectors, though this evidence is still not fully conclusive. More importantly for this question, this increase has been slow and secular, so not what could contribute to a sudden surge to inflation.
Aguiar
Mark Aguiar
Princeton
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bergemann
Dirk Bergemann
Yale
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
I think "price gouging" is a term that does not have a real meaning to economists? If it means "market power", yes in some segments (poultry) and no in others (retail).
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Strongly Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Glaeser
Edward Glaeser
Harvard
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Hurst
Erik Hurst
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Some rhetorical question here in def of price gouging.
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Pathak
Parag Pathak
MIT
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Increasing grocery prices are a particularly visible manifestation of inflation, which has many causes (such as a lack of fiscal discipline) much more important than price gouging.
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Scott Morton
Fiona Scott Morton
Yale
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
The lack of evidence does not mean the behavior wasn't present because it is difficult to study. The pandemic shortages changed expectations, allowing firms to raise prices for multiple reasons.
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Stokey
Nancy Stokey
University of Chicago
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Syverson
Chad Syverson
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Don't know price gouging's precise definition, so I will answer "uncertain." (Handwaving plagues the current discussion of grocery prices.) If it is standing in for some shifting competitive equilibrium markup, then paper linked below is convincing that isn't happening.
-see background information here
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
"price gouging" (usually defined as a big increase in price in a crisis like a hurricane) is against the law in many states, and most big firms smartly do the opposite, sell cheap (and give away water) to burnish long-term reputation. Irrelevant to food inflation.
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History

Question D Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
The devil may be in the detail. In sectors with very high markups, reasonably well designed price controls may create fewer distortions. On the whole, however, price controls could easily get out of hand and cause damage.
Aguiar
Mark Aguiar
Princeton
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
But sometimes their absence also enables other distortions, such as in markets for patented pharmaceuticals, or the extreme fees charged by banks and credit card companies to exploit the vulnerabilities of low income consumers
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Bergemann
Dirk Bergemann
Yale
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Widespread price constraints stifle supply and allocative efficiency.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Strongly Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Glaeser
Edward Glaeser
Harvard
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Hurst
Erik Hurst
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Pathak
Parag Pathak
MIT
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Scott Morton
Fiona Scott Morton
Yale
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Stokey
Nancy Stokey
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Syverson
Chad Syverson
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Widespread price controls have been tried in many settings and end up being, euphemistically, a huge mess. Pairing them with quantity restrictions can limit some types of damage but create others.
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History