Question A:

Even if the mortality of COVID-19 proves to be limited (similar to the number of flu deaths in a regular season), it is likely to cause a major recession.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

The economic effects of COVID-19 coming from reduced spending will be larger than those coming from disruptions to supply chains and illness-related workforce reductions.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question C:

The economic policy institutions of the Eurozone are well equipped to ameliorate the potential economic damage from COVID-19.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
I’m not sure what “major” means. I interpreted it in terms of magnitude, which is likely to be large. But it may be quite short-lived.
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Huge supply, demand and uncertainty shock. Vix is almost as 50.
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
the contagion rate worries more than the mortality rate itself as it shuts down the whole economy to contain effect on the health system
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Two quarters of negative growth, yes; major recession: very uncertain, depends notably on policy reactions
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Contemporary Interconnectedness between industries and countries turns a gridlock in one industry into a complete recession
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
To stop its spread it requires stopping economic activity altogether - a major supply shock
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Even if death rate is low it will be because containment has been effective and that will adversely affect aggregate supply and demand.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
Strongly Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
The severity of the downturn likely differs by country, but in many countries the knock-on effects are already quite severe.
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
But the premise is wrong: its mortality is significantly larger than a regular flu!
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Confinement measures. Confidence.
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
short and sharp in the best of worlds; long and deep if there is a wave of bankruptcies
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
This is both a major supply and demand shock. It is hard to see any circumstances in which measured GDP does not decline significantly.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
What matters is the duration of the pandemic, not the number of causalties.
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Both will be at play. For some sectors (services) demand will be key; but supply disruptions will be serious in manufacturing.
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
the main effect may come from the restrictions needed to contain the epidemic.
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Again The demand side impact will depend much on the policy reactions
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Uncertain
10
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Not if sufficient countercyclical fiscal policies are put in place.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Obviously hard to separate supply & demand, but question is essentially asking whether there is big multiplier from shock, my answer is yes.
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
At least initially. The supply effects are likely to kick in later on.
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Hard to disentangle supply and demand effects. And beware financial consequences -- credit crunch, loan defaults, effects on insurers, etc.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
We don't know. Both elements will play a role.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Although the latter is a function of the former.
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University
Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History

Question C Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
not without a change in fiscal attitudes and rules---which may come, under pressure
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Bénassy-Quéré
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Paris School of Economics
Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Too much depend on limited willingness to increase common EU budget
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Lack of a unified approach makes it inefficient
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Euroze budget is too small
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Fiscal measures likely too slow
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy
Disagree
2
Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
EU's supranational structure allows ctrys to help each other. Unclear how effective EU is. ECB has little room. Fiscal response necessary.
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po
Disagree
1
Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Neary
Peter Neary
Oxford
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
A Draghi-style "whatever it takes" commitment can stabilize markets and avoid mass bank runs; but fiscal support would help a lot
O'Rourke
Kevin O'Rourke
Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
No, not at all. We would need a EU health authority to take over in this kind of EU-WIDE emergency situations!
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
Disagree
2
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
Strongly Disagree
10
Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
The main uncertainty is about the likelihod of a coordinated fiscal response.
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Lack of fiscal coordination. And financial sector measures could have adverse fiscal consequences in some scenarios.
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Strongly Disagree
9
Bio/Vote History
Just like in 2007-8, Europe is out for lunch when it matters. The one viable actor in times of crisis is the nation state.
Weder di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro
The Graduate Institute, Geneva Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
The absence of a common fiscal instrument (e.g. eurobonds) makes it difficult to have a large co-ordinated fiscal response.
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Besides the ECB, which will play second fiddle, the really important actions will be at the national level, coordinated hopefully.
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History