Question A:
Even if the mortality of COVID-19 proves to be limited (similar to the number of flu deaths in a regular season), it is likely to cause a major recession.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
The economic effects of COVID-19 coming from reduced spending will be larger than those coming from disruptions to supply chains and illness-related workforce reductions.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
The economic policy institutions of the Eurozone are well equipped to ameliorate the potential economic damage from COVID-19.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
I’m not sure what “major” means. I interpreted it in terms of magnitude, which is likely to be large. But it may be quite short-lived.
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Huge supply, demand and uncertainty shock. Vix is almost as 50.
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
the contagion rate worries more than the mortality rate itself as it shuts down the whole economy to contain effect on the health system
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
Two quarters of negative growth, yes; major recession: very uncertain, depends notably on policy reactions
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
Contemporary Interconnectedness between industries and countries turns a gridlock in one industry into a complete recession
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
To stop its spread it requires stopping economic activity altogether - a major supply shock
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
Even if death rate is low it will be because containment has been effective and that will adversely affect aggregate supply and demand.
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
The severity of the downturn likely differs by country, but in many countries the knock-on effects are already quite severe.
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
But the premise is wrong: its mortality is significantly larger than a regular flu!
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
Confinement measures. Confidence.
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
short and sharp in the best of worlds; long and deep if there is a wave of bankruptcies
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Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
This is both a major supply and demand shock. It is hard to see any circumstances in which measured GDP does not decline significantly.
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
What matters is the duration of the pandemic, not the number of causalties.
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
Both will be at play. For some sectors (services) demand will be key; but supply disruptions will be serious in manufacturing.
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
the main effect may come from the restrictions needed to contain the epidemic.
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
Again The demand side impact will depend much on the policy reactions
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
Not if sufficient countercyclical fiscal policies are put in place.
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
Obviously hard to separate supply & demand, but question is essentially asking whether there is big multiplier from shock, my answer is yes.
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
At least initially. The supply effects are likely to kick in later on.
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Hard to disentangle supply and demand effects. And beware financial consequences -- credit crunch, loan defaults, effects on insurers, etc.
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
We don't know. Both elements will play a role.
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
Although the latter is a function of the former.
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question C Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
---|---|---|---|---|
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
not without a change in fiscal attitudes and rules---which may come, under pressure
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||||
Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
Too much depend on limited willingness to increase common EU budget
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
Lack of a unified approach makes it inefficient
|
||||
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
Euroze budget is too small
|
||||
Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
Fiscal measures likely too slow
|
||||
Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
EU's supranational structure allows ctrys to help each other. Unclear how effective EU is. ECB has little room. Fiscal response necessary.
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||||
Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
A Draghi-style "whatever it takes" commitment can stabilize markets and avoid mass bank runs; but fiscal support would help a lot
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
No, not at all. We would need a EU health authority to take over in this kind of EU-WIDE emergency situations!
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
||||
Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
The main uncertainty is about the likelihod of a coordinated fiscal response.
|
||||
Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
||||
John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Lack of fiscal coordination. And financial sector measures could have adverse fiscal consequences in some scenarios.
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
Just like in 2007-8, Europe is out for lunch when it matters. The one viable actor in times of crisis is the nation state.
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Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
The absence of a common fiscal instrument (e.g. eurobonds) makes it difficult to have a large co-ordinated fiscal response.
|
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
Besides the ECB, which will play second fiddle, the really important actions will be at the national level, coordinated hopefully.
|
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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