Question A:
The use of non-compete clauses in US employment contracts reduces workers' mobility and wages by more than is justified by the protection of employers' intellectual property and trade secrets.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
7%
0%
0%
2%
12%
60%
19%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
0%
3%
11%
59%
27%
Question B:
Occupational licensing reduces mobility and wages for workers in many sectors where they could safely deliver services that consumers would prefer to those offered by licensed workers.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
7%
0%
0%
2%
14%
44%
33%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
0%
2%
14%
39%
45%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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No definitive evidence on this. Seems plausible that non-competes are bad for workers and mobility. Caveat: one good paper finds 0 effects.
-see background information here |
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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IP is an important issue and there are settings where some form of noncompete agreement makes sense. But there are problematic settings.
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Some noncompetes are clearly warranted, many not.
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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An extremely fact-intensive question.
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Noncompetes make sense if firms train workers or if workers acquire confidential information. But they seem to be used much more broadly.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Short-term (6-12 months) non-compete clauses may be reasonable in some situations. But labor mobility is more important now than before.
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Particularly for low skill workers. We know less about higher skill workers.
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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For example, fast-food restaurants have imposed non-compete clauses, where one suspects there is little to protect.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There is however good evidence that it restricts workers' mobility and protects older firms against entrants.
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It does not seem that non-compete clauses designed to reduce mobility are enforceable, but they may still scare workers
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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"Many" is difficult to judge. The evidence is far from compelling. In some occs, licensing is here rent-seeking. In others, it may be useful
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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See forthcoming ReStud paper by Morris Kleiner and MIT PhD student Evan Soltas, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3140912
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This obviously varies by sector, but many such licensing requirements are unnecessary.
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Protected workers wages often enjoy higher wages, while excluded workers suffer. See "Cartels by Another Name "
-see background information here |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In this case, "many" is to strong for me.
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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occupational licensing is an entry barrier; it should increase wages. And the evidence suggests it does: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Legislatures seem to cave into special interests but this quest ion is also fact intensive.
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Skills matter in today's world. Certificates/licenses less. But in some occupations of course essential for safety reasons.
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Peter Q Blair (Harvard) gave great advice on this topic! I do not have enough characters to summarize his expert thoughts but consult him.
-see background information here -see background information here -see background information here |
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The issue is less about the consumer side and more about the worker side.
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lots of rent seeking behind these rules
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Licenses are sometimes essential (e.g., surgeons), but are too often used to limit entry and generate rents for incumbents.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kleiner and Kruger provide evidence that licensing increases wages while certification has much smaller effect.
-see background information here |
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Some licensing requirements are important for safety (e.g. physicians). The problem is unnecessary or over-strict requirements.
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Strict occupational licensing tends to benefit workers with licenses but serves as an obstacle to those who are not (yet) licensed.
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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