Question A:
When economic policy-makers are unable to commit credibly in advance to a specific decision rule, they will often follow a poor policy trajectory.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Rules-based fiscal policies deliver substantially better outcomes than purely discretionary, on the spot, policy choices.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Question B Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
This would depend on how rule-based policies are conceptualized/specified and how (and whether) they respond to emergencies and previously-unforeseen events.
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
Clearly superiority depends upon the rule. But there is little question that there are fiscal rules that are better defaults than the current default. The current default is that without action (to at least raise debt ceiling), much spending stops and all heck breaks loose.
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
In general this is true, but there are situations that call for discretion.
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Rules without discretion can turn crises into disasters.
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
Same reason as before.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
Some commitments clearly valuable
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Rules to keep Social Security solvent would be good, but politics get in the way. Most rules are too simple to handle rare events. In 1942 the US needed a new tax system. What rule could have handled the 2008 financial crisis? COVID?
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
depends on the rule...
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Rules have the advantage of avoiding time inconsistency, while discretionary policy can adapt to unanticipated circumstances. The ideal is presumably some mix, which I suspect is closer to rule based than our current policy making.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
However, since it is impossible to foresee all possible contingencies, discretion is sometimes needed.
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
I have half-jokingly suggested that we assign monetary policies in crises at random to central banks. So for no central banker has found this idea either attractive or funny, but lacking that I repeat: how would we know?
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
Related to above. I'm not sure that ability to commit outweighs flexibility in response to surprises, particularly unforseen events.
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