Factors Contributing to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis

Please rate the importance (0=none; 5= highest) of each item below (presented to panelists in randomized order) in contributing to the 2008 global financial crisis.

The following items were presented to panelists in randomized order.

1. Inadequate or flawed regulation, supervision, or both with respect to the financial sector (which includes financial infrastructure, banks, shadow banks, and interconnections in the system)
2. Underestimation of the riskiness of securities created with financial engineering
3. Bad incentives, fraud, or both in mortgage issuance and securitization
4. Funding runs involving short-term liabilities financing long-term assets
5. Failures by rating agencies
6. Inflated beliefs about housing prices
7. Elevated levels of US household debt as of 2007
8. A belief by bankers that their institutions were Too Big to Fail
9. Government involvement in subsidizing mortgages, homeownership, or both
10. Imbalances between global savings and well-functioning channels for investing those savings
11. Loose monetary policy by the Fed, by central banks around the world, or both
12. Fair value or mark-to-market accounting for financial assets held by banks

Below are the individual responses for the US Panel.
Click here for the individual responses for the European Panel.

Participant	University	Vote	Confidence	Comment Bio/Vote History
Daron Acemoglu	MIT	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 5 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	6	Bio/Vote History
Alberto Alesina	Harvard	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 1 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2 E. Rating Agency Failures 1 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	3	It is a bit of everything not easy to put weights on every single factor Bio/Vote History
Joseph Altonji	Yale	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion0 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	4	Bio/Vote History
Alan Auerbach	Berkeley	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	5	Bio/Vote History
David Autor	MIT	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 5 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	6	Bio/Vote History
Katherine Baicker	Chicago	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Abhijit Banerjee	MIT	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	4	Bio/Vote History
Marianne Bertrand	Chicago	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 4 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	6	Bio/Vote History
Markus Brunnermeier	Princeton	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 4 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	9	In addition, there were some global factors which made the crisis spread to Europe and the rest of the world. Bio/Vote History
Raj Chetty	Stanford	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Judith Chevalier	Yale	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures No Opinion F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels No Opinion H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	3	Assessing the relative contribution of intertwined factors hard to do with high confidence. Bio/Vote History
David Cutler	Harvard	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	3	Bio/Vote History
Angus Deaton	Princeton	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 1 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 1 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	6	I have marked down importance if item seems to be more of consequence than a cause. Bio/Vote History
Darrell Duffie	Stanford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures No Opinion F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	10	Causes and responsibilities are related but not the same. Regulators bear significant responsibility for weak oversight. Systemic risk is an externality that calls for supervision. The most proximate causes were runs on short term debt (D. Diamond). Bio/Vote History
Aaron Edlin	Berkeley	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 0 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 4 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	6	Bio/Vote History
Barry Eichengreen	Berkeley	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 2	5	Bio/Vote History
Liran Einav	Stanford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	5	Bio/Vote History
Ray Fair	Yale	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 2 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 0 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 0 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	5	Bio/Vote History
Amy Finkelstein	MIT	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	3	Bio/Vote History
Pinelopi Goldberg	Yale	Did Not Answer	5	Bio/Vote History
Austan Goolsbee	Chicago	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 2 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	8	Some of those were symptoms rather than causes but it’s a pretty comprehensive list. Bio/Vote History
Michael Greenstone	Chicago	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 2	6	Bio/Vote History
Robert Hall	Stanford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 1 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 1 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 2 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 1 G. Household Debt Levels 1 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 5 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	1	The government’s policies of bailing out financial institutions created a fragile financial system. Financial collapse resulted in a major loss of confidence. Bio/Vote History
Oliver Hart	Harvard	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 5 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 4 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	8	People believed that aggregate house prices would always rise. Subprime mortgages / looked attractive even though they weren’t. There was fraud but also overconfidence. When many key firms fail at the same time politics forces the government to act. Bio/Vote History
Bengt Holmström	MIT	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) No Opinion C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 1 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 5 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	6	Bio/Vote History
Caroline Hoxby	Stanford	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Hilary H” alt=”Hoynes” width=”80″ /> Hilary Hoynes	Berkeley	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs No Opinion I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy No Opinion L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	6	Bio/Vote History
Kenneth Judd	Stanford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 1 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 0 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	6	Bio/Vote History
Steven Kaplan	Chicago	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	6	Bio/Vote History
Anil Kashyap	Chicago	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 2 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	9	i teach a class on financial crises with a big focus on the last crisis. the votes reflect the time spent in class on the various features. the squam lake report still reads well as a description of problems and suggestions about what to do. -see background information hereBio/Vote History
Pete Klenow	Stanford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	5	-see background information here -see background information hereBio/Vote History
Jonathan Levin	Stanford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 4 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting 2	1	Bio/Vote History
Eric Maskin	Harvard	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 2	7	-see background information here Bio/Vote History
William Nordhaus	Yale	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 2 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 0 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	8	Bio/Vote History
Emmanuel Saez	Berkeley	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	5	Bio/Vote History
Larry Samuelson	Yale	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 1 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	5	Bio/Vote History
José Scheinkman	Princeton	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 2 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	8	Inflated housing prices would have collapsed, but with much less severe global consequences if financial institutions had not chosen to hold as much housing risk (due to greed or stupidity) or if regulators and rating agents had done their jobs. Bio/Vote History
Richard Schmalensee	MIT	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2 E. Rating Agency Failures 2 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 1 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 0 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	3	Bio/Vote History
Carl Shapiro	Berkeley	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	6	Bio/Vote History
Robert Shimer	Chicago	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 2 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 1 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	2	Bio/Vote History
Richard Thaler	Chicago	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	3	No one cause. Lots of blame to attribute. Bio/Vote History
Christopher Udry	Yale	Did Not Answer	7	Bio/Vote History