About
- Savings Banks Foundations and Swedbank Chair in Macroeconomics
- Director of the CEPR Program in International Macroeconomics (2006-11), Fellow of the Econometric Society (since 2006)
- Wallenberg Scholar (2011), Söderberg Prize (2007)
- Member of the Prize Committee for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (2003-13 and 2017-19), Chair from 2011-13
Voting History
Question A:Rising inequality is straining the health of liberal democracy.
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Question B: Enacting more redistributive expenditures and policies would be likely to limit the rise of populism in Europe.
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Question C: European governments should allocate more resources to policies that would be likely to limit the rise of populism in Europe, even if it means higher public debt or lower public spending in other areas.
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Question A:At this point, there is little that the European Central Bank can do to increase or maintain output in the Eurozone.
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Question B: When the economy is operating below its potential, larger fiscal deficits are likely to increase demand and output.
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Comment: If the government’s money isn’t wasted.
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Question C: When the economy is operating below its potential and monetary policy is at the effective lower bound, fiscal policy should prioritize increasing output over decreasing public debt.
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Comment: Ok if debt position is not in danger zone.
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Question A:Selecting candidates for membership of the ECB Executive Board based primarily on nationality ahead of competence is likely to have a negative effect on the quality of monetary policy in the Eurozone.
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Comment: To maintain broad support among euro member countries representativeness may also be relevant.
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Question B: Although the central bank can never be an entirely technocratic institution, the selection process for the ECB President and members of the Executive Board is significantly worsened by intergovernmental trade-offs involving appointments to other European institutions.
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On bids for infrastructure projects, the average European would be better off if Europe’s governments favored European firms over Chinese firms (or firms from any other country with non-profit-related geopolitical strategies) — even if it means sometimes choosing a higher-cost bidder.
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Comment: I take it that the comparison includes all components (quality, on-time delivery, etc). Helping inefficient companies doesn’t improve them.
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Question A: Breaking the “doom loop” — a negative spiral that can result when banks hold sovereign bonds and governments bail out banks — would increase the stability of European economies in the event of another financial crisis.
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Question B: Regulators should try to break the doom loop by assigning positive risk weights — in calculating banks’ capital requirements — to banks’ holdings of domestic and other Eurozone sovereign bonds.
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Question C: Breaking the doom loop would impose substantial costs on powerful political constituencies.
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