By Topic

This week’s IGM Economic Experts Panel statements: A: Taking into account all of the economic consequences — including the incentives of banks to ensure their own liquidity and solvency in the future — the benefits of bailing out U.S. banks in 2008 will end up exceeding the costs. B: Because GM and Chrysler were bailed out in 2008-09, the U.S. unemployment rate was lower at the end of 2010 than it would it have been if Congress and the executive branch had not intervened. C: Taking into account all of the economic consequences — including effects on corporate managers' incentives and on creditors' expectations of how their claims will be treated in future bankruptcies — the benefits of bailing out GM and Chrysler will end up exceeding the costs. 

This week’s IGM Economic Experts Panel poll statement: Because the U.S. Treasury bailed out and backstopped banks (by injecting equity into them in late 2008, and later committing to provide public capital to any banks that failed the stress tests and could not raise private capital), the U.S. unemployment rate was lower at the end of 2010 than it would have been without these measures. 

This European survey examines (a) The UK’s removal of the cap on bankers' bonuses (introduced by the EU in 2014 and which limits payouts to two times annual base salary) will provide a measurable boost to the country’s economic growth; (b) Removing the cap on bankers' bonuses will measurably enhance the global competitiveness of the UK’s financial services sector; (c) Removing the cap on bankers' bonuses will pose a measurable risk to financial stability in the UK. 

This US survey examines (a) Financial regulators in the US and Europe lack the tools and authority to deter runs on banks by uninsured depositors; (b) Not guaranteeing uninsured deposits at Silicon Valley Bank in full would have created substantial damage to the US economy; (c) Fully guaranteeing uninsured deposits at Silicon Valley Bank substantially increases banks’ incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking 

This European survey examines (a) Financial regulators in the US and Europe lack the tools and authority to deter runs on banks by uninsured depositors; (b) Not guaranteeing uninsured deposits at Silicon Valley Bank in full would have created substantial damage to the US economy; (c) Fully guaranteeing uninsured deposits at Silicon Valley Bank substantially increases banks’ incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking 

This Finance survey examines (a) Financial regulators in the US and Europe lack the tools and authority to deter runs on banks by uninsured depositors; (b) Not guaranteeing uninsured deposits at Silicon Valley Bank in full would have created substantial damage to the US economy; (c) Fully guaranteeing uninsured deposits at Silicon Valley Bank substantially increases banks’ incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking 

This US survey examines (a) Research on the nature and impact of bank runs has made it possible to limit substantially the wider economic damage from financial crises; (b) Reforms of financial regulation since 2008 (and macroprudential policies in some countries) will not substantially reduce the probability of financial crises 

This European survey examines (a) Research on the nature and impact of bank runs has made it possible to limit substantially the wider economic damage from financial crises; (b) Reforms of financial regulation since 2008 (and macroprudential policies in some countries) will not substantially reduce the probability of financial crises. 

This week’s IGM Economic Experts Panel statements: A: The U.S government should make further efforts to shrink the size of the country's largest banks — such as by capping the size of their liabilities or penalizing large banks more heavily through taxes or other means — because the existing regulations do not require the biggest banks to internalize enough of the "too-big-to-fail" risks that they pose. B: The economic benefits to the U.S. of having a handful of banks with balance sheets greater than $1 trillion are small.