Question A:
Even if the mortality of COVID-19 proves to be limited (similar to the number of flu deaths in a regular season), it is likely to cause a major recession.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
16%
2%
0%
5%
26%
42%
9%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
0%
8%
31%
44%
18%
Question B:
The economic effects of COVID-19 coming from reduced spending will be larger than those coming from disruptions to supply chains and illness-related workforce reductions.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
16%
0%
0%
5%
47%
33%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
0%
3%
52%
44%
0%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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if what is happening in Italy happens broadly it will be major recession
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Recession seems likely because of the drastic and accelerating fall in regular consumer and business activity
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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We see initial signs of a recession in debt and equity pricing, and in fiscal and monetary policy responses.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Confident that "uncertain" is correct. Depends on what you mean by "major". Depends also on the policy response, weather, hand washing etc.
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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depends critically on how long the peak transmission period lasts
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Expressing an opinion would conflict with my duties chairing the NBER biz cycle chronology committee
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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If it is like ordinary flu, then economy should quickly recover. COVID-19 only threatens old and feeble economic expansions.
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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a sharp slowdown is likely, whether it will be persistent enough to rise to the level of a recession is not clear yet: see nber definition
-see background information here |
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sadly, the loss in welfare will exceed the decline in economic activity, given mortality and morbidity.
-see background information here |
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Some sort of recession seems inevitable---indeed, it may already have begun. Forecasting its magnitude is harder
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The COVID-19 wreaks more havoc through panic and disruption than death. To avoid recession, we could view COVID-19 as we do the flu.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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"Major" might be a bit too strong, but the precautionary measures being taken in many countries will have a significant disruptive effect.
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Likely to cause a recession. Major recession is less clear, since it could be brief.
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But it could be *much* worse
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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...but an unusual recession, driven by the interactions of epidemiology, politics, psychology and economics. Needs a more creative response.
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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hard too know which us bigger this is a new situation we dont have a clue
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Supply chains are mostly about goods production, but manufacturing <20% of GDP. Services are a larger share of GDP & may be more exposed
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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For me, this is just too hard to disentangle.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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As someone who's estimated lots of models designed to distinguish supply and demand shocks, good luck identifying them.
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Especially in rich countries where services dominate the economy, social distancing and withdrawal from will be the toughest part
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I'm certain that the answer is totally uncertain.
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Demand will fall only if COVID-19 is more serious than it appears to be.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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lots of industries have a collapse in demand and their workers will see incomes shrink
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It partly depends on how much uncertainty depresses consumption.
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Again, panic is the key danger from COVID-19, leading to demand disruption more serous than that encountered on the supply side.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Too early to call, I think. Workforce disruptions will affect demand as well as supply.
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Supply chain disruptions look to be short-lived. Income loss for hourly workers and those in travel, entertainment, etc will matter more
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The demand effects might be large. But the most important impacts will happen on the supply side, I think, and that's where we should focus.
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