Question A:
Having companies run to maximize shareholder value creates significant negative externalities for workers and communities.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
21%
0%
6%
6%
33%
21%
13%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
9%
6%
34%
29%
22%
Question B:
Appropriately managed corporations could create significantly greater value than they currently do for a range of stakeholders – including workers, suppliers, customers and community members – with small impacts on shareholder value.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
21%
4%
2%
4%
23%
44%
2%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
5%
3%
30%
58%
4%
Question C:
Effective mechanisms for boards of directors to ensure that CEOs act in ways that balance the interests of all stakeholders would be straightforward to introduce.
Responses
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
21%
2%
13%
29%
21%
15%
0%
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
© 2025. Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets.
18%
39%
25%
17%
0%
Question A Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I think the issue of stakeholder governance is a very important and much understudied subject. It has been difficult to publish papers.
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 Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Depends on the horizon of the shareholders and on the regulation.
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 Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not necessarily. Depends on distortions in the market and in the economy as a whole.
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 Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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2 caveats: 1 if there are inefficiencies at firm level (market power in output or input); 2 channel may be indirect via equil wages
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 Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pollution the most obvious, but also other social costs.
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 Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sometimes does, sometimes not. When it does, law and regulation can/should be used to counteract.
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 Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There is a route to maximizing shareholder value while simultaneously upholding stakeholder utility: That is German Ordnungspolitik.
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 Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Co should max sh welfare not value. Even Milton F recognized these externalities, need laws & ethics as constraints & perhaps stronger ones.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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 Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I agree with this statement, though maximizing shareholder value also encourages efficient profit-making which has social value
|
||||
 Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
 Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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True but it creates not only negative but also positive externalities. The net effect varies across firms.
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||||
 Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
 Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
 Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
 Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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For example carbon is not properly priced.
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||||
 Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
 John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Uncertain because much depends on surrounding public policies towards such externalities.
|
||||
 Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
 Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
 Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This could be the case (e.g. if profit maximizing involved polluting the environment) but these cases are best dealt with via regulation.
|
||||
 Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
 Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Question B Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Again very understudied.
|
||||
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Probably not at short horizon. More uncertain at longer horizons.
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Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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there are probably such cases. In general, it is primarily the job of the government to put in place the right regulations.
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||||
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Provided a long run perspective is adopted
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Short-termism and weak ethical principles likely limit the social contribution of many corporations, especially in complex market segments.
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||||
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
In its generality, the statement is hard to disagree with...
|
||||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Unlikely as implies corp leave lots money on table or managers extract huge rents; yet maximizing stakeh. welfare could address externalit.
-see background information here -see background information here |
||||
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Modern corporations should be regulated, including anti-trust, regulation to ensure compliance with environmental and labor standards, etc.
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Possible for some firms, but unlikely for most.
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||||
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Some cost cutting decisions are often very short term and destroy value in the long run. Example: fraud (diesel emissions scandal)
|
||||
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I'm not sure there is sufficient empirical evidence to back up this statement.
|
||||
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
Question C Participant Responses
Participant |
University |
Vote |
Confidence |
Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
I think it will be very difficult to do in practice. The German system of codetermination may be better.
|
||||
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
I believe in more representation of workers on the board, primarily for information and trust reasons.
|
||||
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Introducing such mechanisms would not be straightforward, but something can be done
|
||||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Regulation and legal mechanisms must be complemented by changes in investors’ convictions!
|
||||
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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|
||||
|
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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|
||||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Not even sure current systems guarantee maximum shareholder value
|
||||
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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|
||||
|
Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Long term profitability will not be maximized when other stakeholders' interests are manifestly violated.
|
||||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
It would clearly be difficult but this does not imply that one should not try. There are many difficult governance problems.
-see background information here |
||||
|
Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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||||
|
Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Regulation is a multi-faceted goal; legistating on the composion of boards of directors may not be a good instrument to achieve it
|
||||
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Needs a lot of information and to design proper incentive mechanisms
|
||||
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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|
||||
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Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Why would this be easy? It's a really complex issue.
|
||||
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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||||
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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