US

China-US Trade War

Over the course of 2018, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on approximately $283 billion of US imports, with rates ranging between 10% and 50%. In response, US trading partners, especially China, retaliated with tariffs averaging 16% on approximately $121 billion of US exports.

With tariff increases, tariffs on further products and Chinese countermeasures all threatened, we invited our US panel to express their views on the likely impact on American households. We asked the experts whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements, and, if so, how strongly and with what degree of confidence:

(a) The incidence of the latest round of US import tariffs is likely to fall primarily on American households.

(b) The impact of the tariffs – and any Chinese countermeasures – on US prices and employment is likely to be felt most heavily by lower income groups and regions.

Tariff incidence

Of our 43 experts, 40 participated in this survey. On the first statement, weighted by each expert’s confidence in their response, 20% strongly agreed, 65% agreed, and 14% were uncertain. (5% of the respondents said that they had no opinion.)

Among the short comments that the experts are able to include when they participate in the survey, several pointed to the evidence in two recent studies published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, both of which find that US consumers have borne the brunt of the current trade war. Others referred to research on the impact of US import restrictions against washing machines.

Maurice Obstfeld at Berkeley said: ‘There is some research to this effect, but this will certainly be true if current tariffs are extended over all US imports from China.’ James Stock at Harvard added: ‘Multiple researchers have found roughly full pass-through, see the recent IMF blog post.’

Although he agreed that the incidence of the tariffs would fall primarily on American households, Darrell Duffie at Stanford remarked: ‘The IMF says so. I’m not confident myself. Some loss to consumers offset by government tariff revenues, eventually reducing taxes.’ Robert Shimer at Chicago also expressed caution: ‘Agree in the short run. In the long run, some production will shift away from China.’

David Autor at MIT observed: ‘They will also fall on Chinese consumers and producers. But within the US, much of incidence appears to be on households so far.’ Daron Acemoglu, who responded that he was uncertain, commented: ‘There is too much uncertainty about how much damage these tariffs will do to China and global growth, so impossible to say.’

Larry Samuelson at Yale concluded: ‘Retaliation raises the very real prospect that American business will also bear a significant burden. Typically, no one wins a trade war.’

Distributional effects

The second statement focused on whether the effects of the tariffs and countermeasures would be felt most heavily by lower income groups and regions. Weighted by each expert’s confidence in their response, 15% strongly agreed, 60% agreed, and 25% were uncertain. (5% of the respondents said that they had no opinion.)

Daron Acemoglu at MIT, who agreed with the statement, noted that: ‘Among US households, lower income ones will bear most direct costs. But hard to know how any damage to global growth affects capital income.’ While Jose Scheinkman at Columbia responded that he was uncertain, he also pointed to analysis, which ‘ concludes that tariff increases in 1963- 2014 resulted in more inequality.’ Pete Klenow at Stanford directed us to further evidence of the distributional effects of trade, as did Judith Chevalier at Yale.

Among the other experts who agreed with the statement, Robert Hall at Stanford said: ‘True almost by definition. Prosperous people are better able to handle any economic change.’ Larry Samuelson at Yale concurred: ‘Those with higher incomes will be better able to adjust to the tariff-induced distortions.’ Robert Shimer at Chicago added: ‘Strongly agree for prices. For employment, impact will be on the middle of the distribution.’

David Autor at MIT raised the broader issue of longstanding US concerns about numerous aspects of China’s industrial, technology and trade policies: ‘Tariffs are undesirable but have gotten China’s attention – important given China’s longstanding trade malpractice.’

All comments made by the experts are in the full survey results.

Romesh Vaitilingam
@econromesh
May 2019

 

 

Question A:

The incidence of the latest round of US import tariffs is likely to fall primarily on American households.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

The impact of the tariffs – and any Chinese countermeasures – on US prices and employment is likely to be felt most heavily by lower income groups and regions.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
There is too much uncertainty about how much damage these tariffs will do to China and global growth, so impossible to say.
Alesina
Alberto Alesina
Harvard
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
They will also fall on Chinese consumers and producers. But within the U.S., much of incidence appears to be on households so far.
Baicker
Katherine Baicker
University of Chicago
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
The IMF says so. I’m not confident myself. Some loss to consumers offset by gov’t tariff revenues, eventually reducing taxes.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee
Chicago
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
[cue music] “I am so smart. I am so smart.” — Homer Simpson Cut to him dancing around, not noticing his living room has caught fire.
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Depends on the measure of incidence--see question b. US is richest in world, so incidence is likely to be smaller.
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
see the research cited below. Winning this trade war has been so easy....
-see background information here
-see background information here
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
There is some research to this effect, but this will certainly be true if current tariffs are extended over all US imports from China.
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Retaliation raises the very real prospect that American business will also bear a significant burden. Typically, no one wins a trade war.
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
this is what Amiti et al. 2019 or Fajgelbaum et al. 2019 conclude.
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Agree in the short run. In the long run, some production will shift away from China.
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Multiple researchers have found roughly full pass-through, see the recent IMF blog post.
-see background information here
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Among US households, lower income ones will bear most direct costs.. But hard to know how any damage to global growth affects capital income
Alesina
Alberto Alesina
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Tariffs are undesirable but have gotten China's attention -- important given China's longstanding trade malpractice
Baicker
Katherine Baicker
University of Chicago
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Strongly Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee
Chicago
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Use your eyes. You aren’t blind.
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
True almost by definition. Prosperous people are better able to handle any economic change.
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Those with higher incomes will be better able to adjust to the tariff-induced distortions.
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Although Furceri et al. 2018 analysis concludes that tariff increases in 1963- 2014 resulted in more inequality.
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Strongly agree for prices. For employment, impact will be on the middle of the distribution.
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History