Over the course of 2018, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on approximately $283 billion of US imports, with rates ranging between 10% and 50%. In response, US trading partners, especially China, retaliated with tariffs averaging 16% on approximately $121 billion of US exports.
With tariff increases, tariffs on further products and Chinese countermeasures all threatened, we invited our US panel to express their views on the likely impact on American households. We asked the experts whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements, and, if so, how strongly and with what degree of confidence:
(a) The incidence of the latest round of US import tariffs is likely to fall primarily on American households.
(b) The impact of the tariffs – and any Chinese countermeasures – on US prices and employment is likely to be felt most heavily by lower income groups and regions.
Tariff incidence
Of our 43 experts, 40 participated in this survey. On the first statement, weighted by each expert’s confidence in their response, 20% strongly agreed, 65% agreed, and 14% were uncertain. (5% of the respondents said that they had no opinion.)
Among the short comments that the experts are able to include when they participate in the survey, several pointed to the evidence in two recent studies published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, both of which find that US consumers have borne the brunt of the current trade war. Others referred to research on the impact of US import restrictions against washing machines.
Maurice Obstfeld at Berkeley said: ‘There is some research to this effect, but this will certainly be true if current tariffs are extended over all US imports from China.’ James Stock at Harvard added: ‘Multiple researchers have found roughly full pass-through, see the recent IMF blog post.’
Although he agreed that the incidence of the tariffs would fall primarily on American households, Darrell Duffie at Stanford remarked: ‘The IMF says so. I’m not confident myself. Some loss to consumers offset by government tariff revenues, eventually reducing taxes.’ Robert Shimer at Chicago also expressed caution: ‘Agree in the short run. In the long run, some production will shift away from China.’
David Autor at MIT observed: ‘They will also fall on Chinese consumers and producers. But within the US, much of incidence appears to be on households so far.’ Daron Acemoglu, who responded that he was uncertain, commented: ‘There is too much uncertainty about how much damage these tariffs will do to China and global growth, so impossible to say.’
Larry Samuelson at Yale concluded: ‘Retaliation raises the very real prospect that American business will also bear a significant burden. Typically, no one wins a trade war.’
Distributional effects
The second statement focused on whether the effects of the tariffs and countermeasures would be felt most heavily by lower income groups and regions. Weighted by each expert’s confidence in their response, 15% strongly agreed, 60% agreed, and 25% were uncertain. (5% of the respondents said that they had no opinion.)
Daron Acemoglu at MIT, who agreed with the statement, noted that: ‘Among US households, lower income ones will bear most direct costs. But hard to know how any damage to global growth affects capital income.’ While Jose Scheinkman at Columbia responded that he was uncertain, he also pointed to analysis, which ‘ concludes that tariff increases in 1963- 2014 resulted in more inequality.’ Pete Klenow at Stanford directed us to further evidence of the distributional effects of trade, as did Judith Chevalier at Yale.
Among the other experts who agreed with the statement, Robert Hall at Stanford said: ‘True almost by definition. Prosperous people are better able to handle any economic change.’ Larry Samuelson at Yale concurred: ‘Those with higher incomes will be better able to adjust to the tariff-induced distortions.’ Robert Shimer at Chicago added: ‘Strongly agree for prices. For employment, impact will be on the middle of the distribution.’
David Autor at MIT raised the broader issue of longstanding US concerns about numerous aspects of China’s industrial, technology and trade policies: ‘Tariffs are undesirable but have gotten China’s attention – important given China’s longstanding trade malpractice.’
All comments made by the experts are in the full survey results.
Romesh Vaitilingam
@econromesh
May 2019
Question A:
The incidence of the latest round of US import tariffs is likely to fall primarily on American households.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
The impact of the tariffs – and any Chinese countermeasures – on US prices and employment is likely to be felt most heavily by lower income groups and regions.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
There is too much uncertainty about how much damage these tariffs will do to China and global growth, so impossible to say.
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
They will also fall on Chinese consumers and producers. But within the U.S., much of incidence appears to be on households so far.
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
The IMF says so. I’m not confident myself. Some loss to consumers offset by gov’t tariff revenues, eventually reducing taxes.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
[cue music]
“I am so smart. I am so smart.” — Homer Simpson
Cut to him dancing around, not noticing his living room has caught fire.
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Depends on the measure of incidence--see question b. US is richest in world, so incidence is likely to be smaller.
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
see the research cited below. Winning this trade war has been so easy....
-see background information here -see background information here |
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
There is some research to this effect, but this will certainly be true if current tariffs are extended over all US imports from China.
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
Retaliation raises the very real prospect that American business will also bear a significant burden. Typically, no one wins a trade war.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
this is what Amiti et al. 2019 or Fajgelbaum et al. 2019 conclude.
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
Agree in the short run. In the long run, some production will shift away from China.
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
Multiple researchers have found roughly full pass-through, see the recent IMF blog post.
-see background information here |
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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